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This study investigates the strategic dynamics of Split Federated Learning by modeling the interaction between model owners and clients as a Stackelberg game. The research analyzes how cut layer selection and incentive mechanisms jointly influence client data contribution, balancing training efficiency with privacy constraints like differential privacy. By proving the existence of a Nash equilibrium, the work provides a theoretical framework for optimizing utility in competitive distributed learning environments.
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How Can Incentives and Cut Layer Selection Influence Data Contribution in Split Federated Learning?

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2412.07813v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: To alleviate the training burden in federated learning while enhancing convergence speed, Split Federated Learning (SFL) has emerged as a promising approach by combining the advantages of federated and split learning. However, recent studies have largely overlooked competitive situations. In this framework, the SFL model owner can choose the cut layer to balance the training load between the server and clients, ensuring the necessary level of privacy for the clients. Additionally, the SFL model owner sets incentives to encourage client participation in the SFL process. The optimization strategies employed by the SFL model owner influence clients' decisions regarding the amount of data they contribute, taking into account the shared incentives over clients and anticipated energy consumption during SFL. To address this framework, we model the problem using a hierarchical decision-making approach, formulated as a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium among clients and analyze the Stackelberg equilibrium by examining the leader's game. Furthermore, we discuss privacy concerns related to differential privacy and the criteria for selecting the minimum required cut layer. Our findings show that the Stackelberg equilibrium solution maximizes the utility for both the clients and the SFL model owner.

Title:How Can Incentives and Cut Layer Selection Influence Data Contribution in Split Federated Learning?

Abstract:To alleviate the training burden in federated learning while enhancing convergence speed, Split Federated Learning (SFL) has emerged as a promising approach by combining the advantages of federated and split learning. However, recent studies have largely overlooked competitive situations. In this framework, the SFL model owner can choose the cut layer to balance the training load between the server and clients, ensuring the necessary level of privacy for the clients. Additionally, the SFL model owner sets incentives to encourage client participation in the SFL process. The optimization strategies employed by the SFL model owner influence clients' decisions regarding the amount of data they contribute, taking into account the shared incentives over clients and anticipated energy consumption during SFL. To address this framework, we model the problem using a hierarchical decision-making approach, formulated as a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium among clients and analyze the Stackelberg equilibrium by examining the leader's game. Furthermore, we discuss privacy concerns related to differential privacy and the criteria for selecting the minimum required cut layer. Our findings show that the Stackelberg equilibrium solution maximizes the utility for both the clients and the SFL model owner.

Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2412.07813 [cs.GT]

(or arXiv:2412.07813v4 [cs.GT] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2412.07813 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

https://doi.org/10.1109/TON.2026.3734988 https://doi.org/10.1109/TON.2026.3734988 Focus to learn more DOI(s) linking to related resources

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 325 words

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