Honeypots for AI Agent Insider Threats

arXiv:2610.26664v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents deployed inside organizations can pose an insider threat if they make mistakes, are compromised by an attacker, or pursue misaligned objectives. We propose honeypots as an AI control method to improve the security of internal agent deployments. Rather than only using honeypots for pre-deployment evaluations, defenders should plant decoy opportunities for harmful actions throughout the production environment to detect misbehavior, incriminate malicious agents, and deter attacks. Such honeypots can elicit misbehavior under real deployment conditions, identify malicious agents even if chain-of-thought monitorability degrades, provide reliable warnings about agent misbehavior to security teams, and scale cheaply to many agent instances. The presence of honeypots also introduces uncertainty about which opportunities are real, thus deterring malicious agents from attacking and reducing the rate of misbehavior. We discuss the limitations of honeypots and give reasons to expect them to remain effective as agent capabilities increase. Finally, we outline key research questions to measure and improve the effectiveness of honeypots: testing the robustness of honeypots, comparing their detection effectiveness with other monitoring methods, understanding their incrimination and deterrence effects, and building supporting infrastructure.

Abstract:AI agents deployed inside organizations can pose an insider threat if they make mistakes, are compromised by an attacker, or pursue misaligned objectives. We propose honeypots as an AI control method to improve the security of internal agent deployments. Rather than only using honeypots for pre-deployment evaluations, defenders should plant decoy opportunities for harmful actions throughout the production environment to detect misbehavior, incriminate malicious agents, and deter attacks. Such honeypots can elicit misbehavior under real deployment conditions, identify malicious agents even if chain-of-thought monitorability degrades, provide reliable warnings about agent misbehavior to security teams, and scale cheaply to many agent instances. The presence of honeypots also introduces uncertainty about which opportunities are real, thus deterring malicious agents from attacking and reducing the rate of misbehavior. We discuss the limitations of honeypots and give reasons to expect them to remain effective as agent capabilities increase. Finally, we outline key research questions to measure and improve the effectiveness of honeypots: testing the robustness of honeypots, comparing their detection effectiveness with other monitoring methods, understanding their incrimination and deterrence effects, and building supporting infrastructure.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2610.26664 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2610.26664v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.26664 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Honeypots for AI Agent Insider Threats

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