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This study introduces HoF-Bench, a rigorous benchmark evaluating LLM-based analyzers on real-world vulnerabilities discovered by the AISLE system in critical open-source projects like OpenSSL. The research demonstrates that even minimal models can rediscover up to 68% of these CVEs under strict protocols without relying on frontier models or prior knowledge of specific fixes, while highlighting persistent challenges with C infrastructure code. This work advances Machine Learning applications in software security by providing a standardized testbed for comparing vulnerability scanner reliability and candidate volume across different model architectures.
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HoF-Bench: Rediscovering Real AI-Discovered CVEs Without Frontier Models

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2607.27030v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based analyzers have begun finding real vulnerabilities in mature open-source projects: AISLE's analyzer is credited with more than 280 CVEs across 78 projects, including OpenSSL, curl, and GnuTLS. We introduce HoF-Bench (named after AISLE's public Hall of Fame), a benchmark built from 95 of these public AI-discovered CVEs across eight repositories pinned at vulnerable commits. Analyzers receive source and target-file scope but not CVE identifiers, descriptions, fixes, or expected mechanisms; a detector-blinded frontier-model judge credits only findings that identify the same code path, root cause, attack condition, and impact. A deliberately minimal LLM-based analyzer rediscovers up to 65 of the 95 CVEs (68%) under this strict protocol. No frontier model performs detection anywhere in the study. The ten detector backbones are five open-weight models (21B--284B total parameters, 3--13B active) and five proprietary small or "flash"-tier models. All of them run in the fixed scaffold with four repeated passes, an optional generated-context stage, and a replayable multi-round triage stage (7,600 model--CVE pass records). Difficulty is strongly structured by language; the CVEs missed by every model concentrate in C infrastructure code. HoF-Bench provides a compact test bed for comparing vulnerability scanners, their reliability across repeated runs, and the candidate volume they create. The dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/aisleinc/HoF-Bench.

Abstract:LLM-based analyzers have begun finding real vulnerabilities in mature open-source projects: AISLE's analyzer is credited with more than 280 CVEs across 78 projects, including OpenSSL, curl, and GnuTLS. We introduce HoF-Bench (named after AISLE's public Hall of Fame), a benchmark built from 95 of these public AI-discovered CVEs across eight repositories pinned at vulnerable commits. Analyzers receive source and target-file scope but not CVE identifiers, descriptions, fixes, or expected mechanisms; a detector-blinded frontier-model judge credits only findings that identify the same code path, root cause, attack condition, and impact. A deliberately minimal LLM-based analyzer rediscovers up to 65 of the 95 CVEs (68%) under this strict protocol. No frontier model performs detection anywhere in the study. The ten detector backbones are five open-weight models (21B--284B total parameters, 3--13B active) and five proprietary small or "flash"-tier models. All of them run in the fixed scaffold with four repeated passes, an optional generated-context stage, and a replayable multi-round triage stage (7,600 model--CVE pass records). Difficulty is strongly structured by language; the CVEs missed by every model concentrate in C infrastructure code. HoF-Bench provides a compact test bed for comparing vulnerability scanners, their reliability across repeated runs, and the candidate volume they create. The dataset is available at this https URL.

15 pages, 6 figures. Benchmark repository: this https URL

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2607.27030 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2607.27030v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.27030 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Full text under the publisher's open licence · 239 words

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