aiqbench analysis
This research identifies a specific attribution bias in Large Language Models where benign framing tokens overshadow cues indicating unethical behavior, leading to safety failures. By applying Layer-wise Relevance Propagation (LRP) to highlight these critical "cue-tokens," the authors demonstrate that decoding strategies can be adjusted to prioritize harmful intent signals and generate safer responses. The findings offer a technical pathway for improving model alignment by correcting internal attention mechanisms rather than relying solely on external instruction tuning.
Hidden in the Request: Explaining Unethical LLM Compliance through Token Relevance
arXiv:2608.23264v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Although Large Language Models (LLMs) are aligned to optimize for both helpfulness and harmlessness, these dual objectives may conflict, inevitably leading to alignment failures. This work systematically investigates instances where LLMs fail to exhibit ethical behavior. To understand the underlying mechanics of these vulnerabilities, we introduce a probing methodology that presents unethical scenarios to LLMs in three distinct structural modalities: objective classification tasks, subjective first-person statements, and direct requests for assistance. We find that model performance degrades in the request-for-assistance-based form. Using Layer-wise Relevance Propagation (LRP), we trace this discrepancy to an attribution bias: the model places greater emphasis on benign task-framing tokens (e.g., "Can you help me...") than on tokens signaling the underlying unethical behavior (e.g., "without getting caught"), which we term cue-tokens. We hypothesize that this under-attribution contributes to harmful compliance. To test this, we introduce two LRP-guided decoding methods that steer generation toward trajectories more relevant to cue tokens. Empirical evaluations show that these interventions promote safer responses, supporting cue-token attribution's role in compliance failures.
Abstract:Although Large Language Models (LLMs) are aligned to optimize for both helpfulness and harmlessness, these dual objectives may conflict, inevitably leading to alignment failures. This work systematically investigates instances where LLMs fail to exhibit ethical behavior. To understand the underlying mechanics of these vulnerabilities, we introduce a probing methodology that presents unethical scenarios to LLMs in three distinct structural modalities: objective classification tasks, subjective first-person statements, and direct requests for assistance. We find that model performance degrades in the request-for-assistance-based form. Using Layer-wise Relevance Propagation (LRP), we trace this discrepancy to an attribution bias: the model places greater emphasis on benign task-framing tokens (e.g., "Can you help me...") than on tokens signaling the underlying unethical behavior (e.g., "without getting caught"), which we term cue-tokens. We hypothesize that this under-attribution contributes to harmful compliance. To test this, we introduce two LRP-guided decoding methods that steer generation toward trajectories more relevant to cue tokens. Empirical evaluations show that these interventions promote safer responses, supporting cue-token attribution's role in compliance failures.
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2608.23264 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2608.23264v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.23264 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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