aiqbench analysis
This research introduces HackProbe, a black-box monitoring system designed to detect and immunize reward hacking in self-evolving language models without requiring access to internal weights or activations. By maintaining a frozen distribution for capability comparison alongside rotating layers, the method effectively identifies divergence between proxy scores and true capabilities while reselecting honest candidates from proposal pools. The study demonstrates that this structural approach significantly reduces false positives and recovers more true capability under hacking conditions compared to baseline methods, offering a critical safety mechanism for autonomous model evolution.
Harness-agnostic detection and immunization of reward hacking in self-evolving language models
arXiv:2609.04665v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Self-evolving language models improve by proposing candidate updates and keeping whatever raises a visible score. When that score is an imperfect proxy for the capability one actually wants, sustained selection widens the gap between the two. This is reward hacking. We introduce HackProbe, a monitor that attaches to an arbitrary self-evolving loop through two black-box hooks, with no access to weights or activations. It keeps a secret, distribution-fixed comparison core, whose frozen distribution makes its capability proxy comparable across generations, alongside a rotated fresh layer that hardens the bank against co-adaptation. Four tests built on that proxy cover the level gap, a scale-aligned divergence with online change-point detection, capability stagnation, and a conditional confidently-wrong rate; a Sidak correction turns them into a calibrated family-wise p-value. Diagnosis alone recovers nothing, so a risk-aware immunization layer reselects an honest candidate from the proposal pool using the core together with a purely structural gaming footprint, disclosing at most log2 Pi bits per generation to the host. We prove a detectability bound that converts a target error rate into an explicit probe-size budget, and we delimit what probe rotation does and does not buy. On a controlled prompt-level host with four injected hacking channels and ground-truth labels, HackProbe reaches 0.763 AUROC against 0.663 for the strongest baseline and cuts the false-positive rate from 0.706 to 0.434. Its bandwidth-limited reselection is the only immunization level that returns more true capability under hacking, 5.2 points on average, than it forfeits on clean runs, 4.7; per-channel effects are mostly not individually significant.
Abstract:Self-evolving language models improve by proposing candidate updates and keeping whatever raises a visible score. When that score is an imperfect proxy for the capability one actually wants, sustained selection widens the gap between the two. This is reward hacking. We introduce HackProbe, a monitor that attaches to an arbitrary self-evolving loop through two black-box hooks, with no access to weights or activations. It keeps a secret, distribution-fixed comparison core, whose frozen distribution makes its capability proxy comparable across generations, alongside a rotated fresh layer that hardens the bank against co-adaptation. Four tests built on that proxy cover the level gap, a scale-aligned divergence with online change-point detection, capability stagnation, and a conditional confidently-wrong rate; a Sidak correction turns them into a calibrated family-wise p-value. Diagnosis alone recovers nothing, so a risk-aware immunization layer reselects an honest candidate from the proposal pool using the core together with a purely structural gaming footprint, disclosing at most log2 Pi bits per generation to the host. We prove a detectability bound that converts a target error rate into an explicit probe-size budget, and we delimit what probe rotation does and does not buy. On a controlled prompt-level host with four injected hacking channels and ground-truth labels, HackProbe reaches 0.763 AUROC against 0.663 for the strongest baseline and cuts the false-positive rate from 0.706 to 0.434. Its bandwidth-limited reselection is the only immunization level that returns more true capability under hacking, 5.2 points on average, than it forfeits on clean runs, 4.7; per-channel effects are mostly not individually significant.
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2609.04665 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2609.04665v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.04665 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 349 words
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