aiqbench analysis
This research introduces HarmProfile, a comprehensive dataset analyzing the distribution of harmful outputs generated by frontier large language models during safety failures rather than just attack outcomes. The findings reveal that while harm scales with model capability, distinct risk profiles exist across different families, indicating dangerous knowledge may lurk beneath an otherwise aligned surface. This work fundamentally shifts AI safety evaluation from treating misbehavior as a binary event to characterizing it as a measurable statistical property of the model itself.
HarmProfile: Characterizing Harmful Distributions in Frontier LLMs
arXiv:2608.14577v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Frontier large language models (LLMs) safety evaluation has largely treated harmful generation as an attack outcome rather than as an object of analysis. Consequently, little is known about the harmful outputs produced during model misbehavior, partly because large-scale, high-quality collections of frontier-LLM misbehavior are difficult to obtain. To address this gap, we introduce HarmProfile, a content-centric benchmark dataset that collects model misbehavior across diverse harm categories and model families, and defines the resulting harmful-output distribution as a model-level risk profile. The premise is that, just as linguistic behavior can be characterized from an utterance corpus, model risk can be characterized from the content, severity, and variation of its safety failures. HarmProfile contains over 80,000 validated artifacts from 23 frontier LLMs across 13 model families, organized into 15 harm categories and 57 subcategories. Using this corpus, we find that frontier LLMs reliably produce harmful content at scale, yet exhibit distinct risk profiles; both harmfulness and diversity grow with model capability, suggesting that frontier LLMs may appear safe yet harbor increasingly dangerous knowledge beneath the alignment surface. Our source code is available at https://github.com/fresh-ma/HarmProfile .
Abstract:Frontier large language models (LLMs) safety evaluation has largely treated harmful generation as an attack outcome rather than as an object of analysis. Consequently, little is known about the harmful outputs produced during model misbehavior, partly because large-scale, high-quality collections of frontier-LLM misbehavior are difficult to obtain. To address this gap, we introduce HarmProfile, a content-centric benchmark dataset that collects model misbehavior across diverse harm categories and model families, and defines the resulting harmful-output distribution as a model-level risk profile. The premise is that, just as linguistic behavior can be characterized from an utterance corpus, model risk can be characterized from the content, severity, and variation of its safety failures. HarmProfile contains over 80,000 validated artifacts from 23 frontier LLMs across 13 model families, organized into 15 harm categories and 57 subcategories. Using this corpus, we find that frontier LLMs reliably produce harmful content at scale, yet exhibit distinct risk profiles; both harmfulness and diversity grow with model capability, suggesting that frontier LLMs may appear safe yet harbor increasingly dangerous knowledge beneath the alignment surface. Our source code is available at this https URL .
Computation and Language (cs.CL); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2608.14577 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2608.14577v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.14577 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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