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This paper introduces FUSE, a modular evaluation framework designed to standardize the assessment of dangerous capabilities in large language models across knowledge, defense, and harm dimensions. The study reveals that newer models do not uniformly improve safety; instead, they often deepen their knowledge base while only partially enhancing defensive mechanisms, leading to divergent safety profiles even within the same model family. This work is critical for researchers and policymakers seeking robust metrics to govern high-risk AI systems beyond simple pass/fail benchmarks.
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FUSE: An Evaluating Framework for Dangerous Capabilities of LLMs

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2609.02168v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Fragmented safety evaluation undermines the governance of dangerous AI capabilities. We present a modular framework that evaluates each model through three orthogonal pipelines---Knowledge ($K$), Defense ($D$), and Harm ($H$)---under a unified protocol, aggregating results into a standardized dangerous-capability profile $\phi$. Pluggable modules supply scenario seeds, knowledge banks, hazard queries, and judge rubrics, while the core evaluation engine remains unchanged across domains; the CB evaluation is complemented by a cyber pilot demonstrating protocol transfer. Instantiating the framework with a chemical-biological (CB) module, we evaluate 12 commercial LLMs from four families. Our first contribution is a horizontal comparison of dangerous capability across models and model families: the three dimensions expose sharply divergent profiles---models with comparable knowledge differ in refusal resilience, and strong defenders do not generate less harmful content when they do comply---while family-level patterns further separate Claude, DeepSeek, and GPT models. The second is a temporal analysis of capability evolution: tracking $K$, $D$, and $H$ against model release dates reveals that dangerous capability has not monotonically declined; newer models deepen knowledge while only partially improving defense, showing that scaling and alignment progress do not uniformly translate into safety. Reliability is established via cross-judge consistency (bootstrap $\rho > 0.79$, 4 of 5 judges) and pipeline orthogonality ($K$--$D$--$H$ inter-correlations $\rho \in [0.32, 0.52]$).

Abstract:Fragmented safety evaluation undermines the governance of dangerous AI capabilities. We present a modular framework that evaluates each model through three orthogonal pipelines---Knowledge ($K$), Defense ($D$), and Harm ($H$)---under a unified protocol, aggregating results into a standardized dangerous-capability profile $\phi$. Pluggable modules supply scenario seeds, knowledge banks, hazard queries, and judge rubrics, while the core evaluation engine remains unchanged across domains; the CB evaluation is complemented by a cyber pilot demonstrating protocol transfer. Instantiating the framework with a chemical-biological (CB) module, we evaluate 12 commercial LLMs from four families. Our first contribution is a horizontal comparison of dangerous capability across models and model families: the three dimensions expose sharply divergent profiles---models with comparable knowledge differ in refusal resilience, and strong defenders do not generate less harmful content when they do comply---while family-level patterns further separate Claude, DeepSeek, and GPT models. The second is a temporal analysis of capability evolution: tracking $K$, $D$, and $H$ against model release dates reveals that dangerous capability has not monotonically declined; newer models deepen knowledge while only partially improving defense, showing that scaling and alignment progress do not uniformly translate into safety. Reliability is established via cross-judge consistency (bootstrap $\rho > 0.79$, 4 of 5 judges) and pipeline orthogonality ($K$--$D$--$H$ inter-correlations $\rho \in [0.32, 0.52]$).

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2609.02168 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2609.02168v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.02168 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 304 words

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