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This research bridges latent-space safety geometry with Jacobian-space readouts, revealing how alignment training widens the gap between internal danger recognition and external behavioral refusal. The study demonstrates that while standard DPO tuning suppresses observable outputs, it simultaneously degrades internal accessibility metrics, suggesting a critical need to monitor these hidden states rather than relying solely on final generation probabilities. Ultimately, the findings argue that robust safety protocols must evolve to operate directly on behaviorally accessible content to prevent adaptive re-attacks by jailbreak techniques.
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From Latent Space to Jacobian Space: Measuring, Evading, and Training Against Safety-Content Accessibility

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2610.04316v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Output-only safety monitoring sees only the end of a model's computation, yet the model computes its answer before emitting it: what it is internally poised to say is safety-critical. Jacobian-space (J-space) readouts, linear maps from hidden states to the output vocabulary via the model's input-output Jacobian, have been proposed as a window on behaviorally accessible internal content, and a first safety protocol (JADR) showed that danger recognition is readable there. What remains unknown is how this accessible content relates to the latent-space safety geometry studied by representation engineering, and how safety training shapes it. We introduce two quantitative bridges: (i) a transport-amplification profile $A_\ell$, measuring how strongly a latent safety direction is carried toward output space by each layer's Jacobian, and (ii) a paired base-vs-tuned protocol that attributes accessibility to training provenance. Across four small model pairs (135M to 1.5B, three lens-fit seeds), tuned checkpoints concentrate recognition in upper-middle layers, and at 0.5B DPO installs refusal while J-space recognition drops to chance: training can widen the accessibility gap exactly where behavioral safety looks best. A deployment audit closes the loop: monitor-aware GCG-style suffixes suppress the prompt-side monitor at zero behavioral cost at every scale; only a learned monitor rung resists its own adaptive re-attack; the training-time defense fails its re-attack at every penalty weight; steering shows the amplification profile is descriptive, not causal; and continuous-prefix optimization fails where discrete search succeeds. Safety monitoring, training, and evaluation must operate on accessibility itself, not on outputs alone.

Abstract:Output-only safety monitoring sees only the end of a model's computation, yet the model computes its answer before emitting it: what it is internally poised to say is safety-critical. Jacobian-space (J-space) readouts, linear maps from hidden states to the output vocabulary via the model's input-output Jacobian, have been proposed as a window on behaviorally accessible internal content, and a first safety protocol (JADR) showed that danger recognition is readable there. What remains unknown is how this accessible content relates to the latent-space safety geometry studied by representation engineering, and how safety training shapes it. We introduce two quantitative bridges: (i) a transport-amplification profile $A_\ell$, measuring how strongly a latent safety direction is carried toward output space by each layer's Jacobian, and (ii) a paired base-vs-tuned protocol that attributes accessibility to training provenance. Across four small model pairs (135M to 1.5B, three lens-fit seeds), tuned checkpoints concentrate recognition in upper-middle layers, and at 0.5B DPO installs refusal while J-space recognition drops to chance: training can widen the accessibility gap exactly where behavioral safety looks best. A deployment audit closes the loop: monitor-aware GCG-style suffixes suppress the prompt-side monitor at zero behavioral cost at every scale; only a learned monitor rung resists its own adaptive re-attack; the training-time defense fails its re-attack at every penalty weight; steering shows the amplification profile is descriptive, not causal; and continuous-prefix optimization fails where discrete search succeeds. Safety monitoring, training, and evaluation must operate on accessibility itself, not on outputs alone.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)

arXiv:2610.04316 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2610.04316v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.04316 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 343 words

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