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FedReview introduces a novel peer-review mechanism for federated learning that mitigates poisoning attacks without relying on server-side validation datasets or prior knowledge of client identities. By leveraging a majority voting system among randomly assigned reviewer clients, the protocol effectively filters suspicious model updates while maintaining flexible participation in adversarial environments. This advancement strengthens the security and robustness of decentralized machine learning systems against malicious data injection.
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FedReview: Review and Dispose Poisoned Updates without Validation Datasets or Historic Knowledge

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2402.16934v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Federated learning has emerged as a decentralized approach for training high-performance models without accessing user data. Despite its effectiveness, it is vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious users manipulate the global model by uploading poisoned updates. In this paper, we propose FedReview, a review-based mechanism to identify and dispose the potential poisoned updates in federated learning. Under FedReview, the server randomly assigns a subset of clients as reviewers to evaluate model updates on their training datasets in each round. The reviewers rank the updates based on evaluation results and estimate the number of low-quality updates as potential poisoned ones. Based on the review reports, the server applies a majority voting mechanism to aggregate rankings, which tolerates wrong rankings from malicious reviewers and guides the removal of suspicious updates during model aggregation. In contrast to prior works such as FLTrust, FedReview does not require a server-side validation dataset or prior knowledge of clients, allowing flexible client participation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FedReview enables the server to learn a well-performing global model in adversarial environments.

Abstract:Federated learning has emerged as a decentralized approach for training high-performance models without accessing user data. Despite its effectiveness, it is vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious users manipulate the global model by uploading poisoned updates. In this paper, we propose FedReview, a review-based mechanism to identify and dispose the potential poisoned updates in federated learning. Under FedReview, the server randomly assigns a subset of clients as reviewers to evaluate model updates on their training datasets in each round. The reviewers rank the updates based on evaluation results and estimate the number of low-quality updates as potential poisoned ones. Based on the review reports, the server applies a majority voting mechanism to aggregate rankings, which tolerates wrong rankings from malicious reviewers and guides the removal of suspicious updates during model aggregation. In contrast to prior works such as FLTrust, FedReview does not require a server-side validation dataset or prior knowledge of clients, allowing flexible client participation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FedReview enables the server to learn a well-performing global model in adversarial environments.

Machine Learning (cs.LG); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

arXiv:2402.16934 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2402.16934v2 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2402.16934 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 272 words

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