aiqbench analysis
FedGraph addresses a critical vulnerability in federated large language model fine-tuning by leveraging graph-based aggregation to distinguish malicious backdoor updates from benign ones based on structural consistency. This approach effectively mitigates the limitations of traditional high-dimensional anomaly detection, offering a robust defense mechanism that significantly lowers attack success rates while maintaining low false positive levels.
FedGraph: Defending Federated Large Language Model Fine-Tuning Against Backdoor Attacks via Graph-Based Aggregation
arXiv:2610.18430v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated fine-tuning of large language models (LLMs) allows multiple clients to collaboratively adapt models without sharing raw data, offering strong privacy benefits. However, this setting is highly vulnerable to backdoor attacks, in which malicious clients manipulate their updates to induce targeted behaviors while maintaining normal performance on benign inputs. In this work, we make a key observation specific to federated LLM fine-tuning: malicious clients tend to exhibit strong consistency in their model updates, whereas benign clients produce more diverse and dispersed updates. This structural difference is not well captured by existing defense methods, which typically rely on direct anomaly detection in high-dimensional parameter space and therefore struggle in the presence of entangled LLM updates. Motivated by this observation, we propose FedGraph, a graph-based aggregation framework that explicitly models relationships among client updates. By representing clients as nodes in a dynamically constructed graph and extracting structural features that characterize their relative positions and interactions, FedGraph derives compact client representations that effectively separate malicious and benign behaviors. These representations are then used to identify and suppress malicious contributions during aggregation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FedGraph significantly improves backdoor defense. It consistently reduces attack success rates to below 10% while achieving high detection accuracy (95.5% on average) and a low false positive rate (2.33%), substantially outperforming existing federated learning defenses.
Abstract:Federated fine-tuning of large language models (LLMs) allows multiple clients to collaboratively adapt models without sharing raw data, offering strong privacy benefits. However, this setting is highly vulnerable to backdoor attacks, in which malicious clients manipulate their updates to induce targeted behaviors while maintaining normal performance on benign inputs. In this work, we make a key observation specific to federated LLM fine-tuning: malicious clients tend to exhibit strong consistency in their model updates, whereas benign clients produce more diverse and dispersed updates. This structural difference is not well captured by existing defense methods, which typically rely on direct anomaly detection in high-dimensional parameter space and therefore struggle in the presence of entangled LLM updates. Motivated by this observation, we propose FedGraph, a graph-based aggregation framework that explicitly models relationships among client updates. By representing clients as nodes in a dynamically constructed graph and extracting structural features that characterize their relative positions and interactions, FedGraph derives compact client representations that effectively separate malicious and benign behaviors. These representations are then used to identify and suppress malicious contributions during aggregation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FedGraph significantly improves backdoor defense. It consistently reduces attack success rates to below 10% while achieving high detection accuracy (95.5% on average) and a low false positive rate (2.33%), substantially outperforming existing federated learning defenses.
Accepted at the ICLR 2026 Workshop on Principled Design for Trustworthy AI. This is an author-owned preprint, not the official proceedings version
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2610.18430 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2610.18430v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.18430 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 337 words
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