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This research investigates the misalignment between Large Language Models and human fairness principles when allocating scarce, indivisible resources. The study reveals that LLMs often exhibit stricter constraints and self-interested behaviors compared to humans, proving difficult to align via standard fine-tuning methods. These findings are critical for developers deploying AI agents in high-stakes decision-making environments where distributional justice is paramount.
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Fair Like Us? Auditing LLM Alignment in Resource Allocation

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2609.29692v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Fair allocation of scarce, indivisible resources is an important challenge in many societal problems. While there are several formal theories of fairness, no single definition can always be satisfied. As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to support decisions and act as agents, they raise new concerns about distributional justice: their judgments are not directly tied to any specific fairness framework and may violate key normative principles. In this work, we introduce a general method for evaluating fairness reasoning in LLMs. We study first-person fairness judgments across a broad set of models and compare them directly with human responses on matched scenarios and elicitation conditions. We find that LLMs tend to prefer stricter fairness constraints than humans, show more self-interested behavior, are sensitive to how information is framed, and are difficult to align with human judgments using fine-tuning with current datasets.

Title:Fair Like Us? Auditing LLM Alignment in Resource Allocation

Abstract:Fair allocation of scarce, indivisible resources is an important challenge in many societal problems. While there are several formal theories of fairness, no single definition can always be satisfied. As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to support decisions and act as agents, they raise new concerns about distributional justice: their judgments are not directly tied to any specific fairness framework and may violate key normative principles. In this work, we introduce a general method for evaluating fairness reasoning in LLMs. We study first-person fairness judgments across a broad set of models and compare them directly with human responses on matched scenarios and elicitation conditions. We find that LLMs tend to prefer stricter fairness constraints than humans, show more self-interested behavior, are sensitive to how information is framed, and are difficult to align with human judgments using fine-tuning with current datasets.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computers and Society (cs.CY); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)

arXiv:2609.29692 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2609.29692v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.29692 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 255 words

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