aiqbench analysis
This research identifies "summary collapse" as a critical privacy vulnerability in multi-agent LLM systems, where compression artifacts inadvertently strip boundary metadata while retaining operational facts. The study demonstrates that vague language prompts significantly increase leakage risks across models like GPT-5-mini and DeepSeek-R1-32B, whereas explicit constraints and audience allowlists effectively mitigate these failures. For developers building agent swarms, the findings underscore that structural safeguards in handoff protocols are essential to prevent unauthorized data propagation.
Facts Without Rules: Boundary Metadata Collapse in Multi-Agent LLM Handoffs
arXiv:2608.29028v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent LLM systems often coordinate by compressing an upstream interaction into a handoff artifact that downstream agents treat as shared state. We show that this handoff step is a structural source of privacy leakage: summaries preferentially preserve operational facts while weakening the boundary metadata that governs how those facts may be used---a failure mode we call \emph{summary collapse}. On a controlled multi-agent coordination testbed we measure marker survival with a human-validated judge ($\kappa = 0.74$), where $\sigma_b = 1$ means every boundary marker survives verbatim and $\sigma_b = 0$ means all are lost. Boundary-marker and operational-fact survival are nearly uncorrelated at the handoff level on both GPT-5-mini and DeepSeek-R1-32B (Pearson $r$ near zero): uncompressed free-text handoffs preserve boundaries at $\sigma_b \approx 0.80$, whereas a $25$-word budget drops $\sigma_b$ to ${\approx}0.57$ while operational-fact survival stays near ceiling. Controlled downstream tests reveal that protection depends on \emph{boundary explicitness}: vague languages leak in $73\%$ of GPT and $50\%$ of DeepSeek cases, while explicit constraints reduce leakage to under $15\%$ across all three tested models. A no-handoff single-agent control further shows the failure is not reducible to multi-agent topology as direct full-marker access still leaks more often than the operationalized handoff. Prompt-only mitigation and exact-string redaction only partially address the problem, while a gold-derived audience allowlist nearly eliminates leakage across models, showing that correctly identifying audience boundaries is the key factor.
Abstract:Multi-agent LLM systems often coordinate by compressing an upstream interaction into a handoff artifact that downstream agents treat as shared state. We show that this handoff step is a structural source of privacy leakage: summaries preferentially preserve operational facts while weakening the boundary metadata that governs how those facts may be used---a failure mode we call \emph{summary collapse}. On a controlled multi-agent coordination testbed we measure marker survival with a human-validated judge ($\kappa = 0.74$), where $\sigma_b = 1$ means every boundary marker survives verbatim and $\sigma_b = 0$ means all are lost. Boundary-marker and operational-fact survival are nearly uncorrelated at the handoff level on both GPT-5-mini and DeepSeek-R1-32B (Pearson $r$ near zero): uncompressed free-text handoffs preserve boundaries at $\sigma_b \approx 0.80$, whereas a $25$-word budget drops $\sigma_b$ to ${\approx}0.57$ while operational-fact survival stays near ceiling. Controlled downstream tests reveal that protection depends on \emph{boundary explicitness}: vague languages leak in $73\%$ of GPT and $50\%$ of DeepSeek cases, while explicit constraints reduce leakage to under $15\%$ across all three tested models. A no-handoff single-agent control further shows the failure is not reducible to multi-agent topology as direct full-marker access still leaks more often than the operationalized handoff. Prompt-only mitigation and exact-string redaction only partially address the problem, while a gold-derived audience allowlist nearly eliminates leakage across models, showing that correctly identifying audience boundaries is the key factor.
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2608.29028 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2608.29028v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.29028 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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