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This research introduces Explanation-Bound Tool Execution (EBTE), a mediation layer that validates AI agent actions by converting model rationales into typed claims checked against server-held facts rather than trusting the models' introspection directly. The study demonstrates this approach through extensive conformance scenarios and metamorphic checks, proving its ability to deny conflicting or uncertain action requests without expanding baseline authority. By formalizing these interactions under trusted-fact assumptions, the work addresses critical safety gaps in tool-using agents where free-form rationales are unreliable for authorization purposes.
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Explanation-Bound Tool Execution for AI Agents: Server-Verified Action Claims Without Trusting Model Rationales

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2607.25364v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales. Such rationales are neither authorization nor reliable introspection. We present Explanation-Bound Tool Execution (EBTE), a claim-carrying mediation layer that converts decision-relevant rationale content into typed action claims and checks them against server-held intent, policy, payload, tool, risk, provenance, and freshness facts. EBTE cannot widen baseline authority: conflicts deny, incomplete or uncertain claims review, and only matching claims remain eligible for governed execution. We formalize this composition under explicit mediation and trusted-fact assumptions and implement a versioned reference profile with minimized audit packets. Across 136 authored conformance scenarios, the full profile matches all specified dispositions, admits none of 96 designated hard contradictions, and passes 232 metamorphic checks; these results validate the included profile rather than population performance. A draft-only reference integration forwards none of 48 authored hard cases under EBTE while preserving all 16 soft-review and 4 aligned draft paths. In a frozen 2026-07-12 exploratory 224-attempt hosted-model record, the historical generation/runner agreement counts are 71/96, 66/96, and 19/32; a separately labeled zero-call post-hoc revalidation of the preserved minimized claims under the current pipeline yields 70/96, 65/96, and 17/32. In an AgentDojo-derived semantic check, existing high-risk controls already make all 12 attack proposals non-allow; EBTE additionally resolves them as deny. These results support the feasibility and diagnostic value of server-checked action claims, not rationale faithfulness, human-review benefit, representative attack resistance, or production safety.

Abstract:Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales. Such rationales are neither authorization nor reliable introspection. We present Explanation-Bound Tool Execution (EBTE), a claim-carrying mediation layer that converts decision-relevant rationale content into typed action claims and checks them against server-held intent, policy, payload, tool, risk, provenance, and freshness facts. EBTE cannot widen baseline authority: conflicts deny, incomplete or uncertain claims review, and only matching claims remain eligible for governed execution. We formalize this composition under explicit mediation and trusted-fact assumptions and implement a versioned reference profile with minimized audit packets. Across 136 authored conformance scenarios, the full profile matches all specified dispositions, admits none of 96 designated hard contradictions, and passes 232 metamorphic checks; these results validate the included profile rather than population performance. A draft-only reference integration forwards none of 48 authored hard cases under EBTE while preserving all 16 soft-review and 4 aligned draft paths. In a frozen 2026-07-12 exploratory 224-attempt hosted-model record, the historical generation/runner agreement counts are 71/96, 66/96, and 19/32; a separately labeled zero-call post-hoc revalidation of the preserved minimized claims under the current pipeline yields 70/96, 65/96, and 17/32. In an AgentDojo-derived semantic check, existing high-risk controls already make all 12 attack proposals non-allow; EBTE additionally resolves them as deny. These results support the feasibility and diagnostic value of server-checked action claims, not rationale faithfulness, human-review benefit, representative attack resistance, or production safety.

28 pages, 1 figure, 15 tables. Preprint

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Software Engineering (cs.SE)

arXiv:2607.25364 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2607.25364v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.25364 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 335 words

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