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This research exposes a critical security vulnerability in self-evolving vision-language model agents, where malicious payloads remain dormant until the system's memory evolves to a specific state. The attack bypasses standard static scanning methods by coupling visual triggers with dynamic memory updates, achieving high success rates only after deployment. This work highlights the unique safety challenges inherent in autonomous systems that continuously adapt their own architectures and knowledge bases.
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EvolvAttack: Backdooring self Evolving VLM Agents

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2610.15244v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Self-evolving mechanisms let vision-language model (VLM) agents continually adapt through evolving memory, but they also allow malicious behavior to emerge only after deployment. We introduce a new attack surface, the self-evolving backdoor, whose payload stays dormant in the initial agent and is progressively activated as the agent evolves. Unlike conventional backdoors, which can be exposed by testing triggered inputs on a static model, our attack requires both a visual trigger and a sufficiently evolved memory state; static scanning with clean memory thus yields near-zero attack success and may deem the agent benign. We realize this through memory-aware backdoor training, which couples trigger activation with the agent's evolving memory while preserving benign behavior unless the trigger co-occurs with payload-related memory. Across three VLM backbones, four agent pipelines, and recency-, semantic-, and reward-based memory evolution, the attack preserves normal functionality and stays nearly inactive before evolution (0.5% attack success rate), yet exceeds 95% attack success within 100 interactions, revealing a stealthy threat unique to self-evolving agents.

Abstract:Self-evolving mechanisms let vision-language model (VLM) agents continually adapt through evolving memory, but they also allow malicious behavior to emerge only after deployment. We introduce a new attack surface, the self-evolving backdoor, whose payload stays dormant in the initial agent and is progressively activated as the agent evolves. Unlike conventional backdoors, which can be exposed by testing triggered inputs on a static model, our attack requires both a visual trigger and a sufficiently evolved memory state; static scanning with clean memory thus yields near-zero attack success and may deem the agent benign. We realize this through memory-aware backdoor training, which couples trigger activation with the agent's evolving memory while preserving benign behavior unless the trigger co-occurs with payload-related memory. Across three VLM backbones, four agent pipelines, and recency-, semantic-, and reward-based memory evolution, the attack preserves normal functionality and stays nearly inactive before evolution (0.5% attack success rate), yet exceeds 95% attack success within 100 interactions, revealing a stealthy threat unique to self-evolving agents.

Machine Learning (cs.LG); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2610.15244 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2610.15244v1 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.15244 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 261 words

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