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This research introduces HAE-GEO, a novel benchmark assessing the resilience of search-augmented LLM agents against Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) poisoning attacks. The study reveals critical vulnerabilities where agents fail to recover from manipulated evidence despite verification mechanisms, highlighting gaps in current agentic search defenses. These findings are essential for understanding the reliability of AI systems making consumer decisions in an increasingly adversarial information landscape.
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Evaluating Deep-Search Agents under Hierarchical Web Evidence Poisoning

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2609.06027v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Search-augmented LLM agents are increasingly used for consumer decisions, making them vulnerable to Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) poisoning. Existing benchmarks largely measure whether manipulated content is retrieved or endorsed, but do not track whether an agent verifies suspicious evidence, revises adopted claims, or recovers before producing its final recommendation. We introduce HAE-GEO, a benchmark that tracks the full trajectory from exposure to recovery under progressively more persuasive Web poisoning. Agents interact via a multi-turn Search-Scrape interface across three attack levels (L1 direct assertion, L2 contextual camouflage, and L3 apparent corroboration), supported by a controlled corpus of 72,039 clean pages and 770 poisoned pages per level spanning 8 product categories and 154 brands. Evaluation combines deterministic behavioral measures with six semantic rubric dimensions. Evaluating 10 agents, we find three recurring patterns: evidence recognition degrades under the corroboration trap; agentic search improves final resistance without improving evidence recognition or utility; and defense prompting increases verification, yet rarely converts verification into recovery.

Abstract:Search-augmented LLM agents are increasingly used for consumer decisions, making them vulnerable to Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) poisoning. Existing benchmarks largely measure whether manipulated content is retrieved or endorsed, but do not track whether an agent verifies suspicious evidence, revises adopted claims, or recovers before producing its final recommendation. We introduce HAE-GEO, a benchmark that tracks the full trajectory from exposure to recovery under progressively more persuasive Web poisoning. Agents interact via a multi-turn Search-Scrape interface across three attack levels (L1 direct assertion, L2 contextual camouflage, and L3 apparent corroboration), supported by a controlled corpus of 72,039 clean pages and 770 poisoned pages per level spanning 8 product categories and 154 brands. Evaluation combines deterministic behavioral measures with six semantic rubric dimensions. Evaluating 10 agents, we find three recurring patterns: evidence recognition degrades under the corroboration trap; agentic search improves final resistance without improving evidence recognition or utility; and defense prompting increases verification, yet rarely converts verification into recovery.

36 pages, 9 figures, and 10 tables. Code and benchmark: this https URL

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Information Retrieval (cs.IR)

arXiv:2609.06027 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2609.06027v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.06027 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 273 words

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