aiqbench analysis
This research introduces a protocol for federated learning that simultaneously ensures robustness against poisoned updates and provides public verifiability of the aggregation process. By leveraging cryptographic commitments and zero-knowledge proofs, the system allows third parties to audit model integrity without compromising client privacy or incurring prohibitive computational costs. The approach effectively mitigates Byzantine attack risks while maintaining high accuracy, addressing a critical gap where previous solutions treated security and verification as separate concerns.
End-to-End Verifiable and Robust Federated Learning
arXiv:2609.15521v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Federated learning enables multiple parties to train a shared model without centralizing raw data with the help of an aggregator, but introduces integrity risks once participants or infrastructure are not fully trustworthy. Two requirements are particularly important: robustness to poisoned or Byzantine client updates, and verifiability of the aggregator so that clients or third parties can audit the reported aggregation without learning individual updates. Existing work has largely treated these goals separately, and efficient public verifiability for robust, outlier-excluding aggregation remains limited. We present a verifiable federated learning protocol that makes a robust aggregation pipeline publicly auditable. Our design combines cryptographic commitments with non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to certify both (i) cosine-similarity-based outlier exclusion and (ii) aggregation over the selected set, without revealing individual client updates to verifiers. In experiments under representative poisoning attacks, our method maintains high accuracy, with an average accuracy loss below 4\% across the evaluated configurations, while keeping verification overhead practical: proof artifacts can be generated and verified within minutes at the scale studied. In summary, our results show that robust outlier exclusion and public verifiability can be jointly achieved in a federated learning setting.
Abstract:Federated learning enables multiple parties to train a shared model without centralizing raw data with the help of an aggregator, but introduces integrity risks once participants or infrastructure are not fully trustworthy. Two requirements are particularly important: robustness to poisoned or Byzantine client updates, and verifiability of the aggregator so that clients or third parties can audit the reported aggregation without learning individual updates. Existing work has largely treated these goals separately, and efficient public verifiability for robust, outlier-excluding aggregation remains limited. We present a verifiable federated learning protocol that makes a robust aggregation pipeline publicly auditable. Our design combines cryptographic commitments with non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to certify both (i) cosine-similarity-based outlier exclusion and (ii) aggregation over the selected set, without revealing individual client updates to verifiers. In experiments under representative poisoning attacks, our method maintains high accuracy, with an average accuracy loss below 4\% across the evaluated configurations, while keeping verification overhead practical: proof artifacts can be generated and verified within minutes at the scale studied. In summary, our results show that robust outlier exclusion and public verifiability can be jointly achieved in a federated learning setting.
Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2609.15521 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2609.15521v1 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.15521 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 282 words
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