Encrypted Neural Networks without Overflows

arXiv:2605.23096v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The popular Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) scheme enables efficient private inference in neural networks by evaluating them on encrypted data. Since CKKS only supports addition, multiplication, and array rotation operations, turning neural networks into CKKS circuits requires approximating all activation functions (e.g. ReLU) with polynomials over fixed input ranges. Traditionally, these ranges are estimated via heuristic sampling techniques. In this paper, we empirically demonstrate that sampled ranges leave the CKKS network exposed to overflow events, i.e. legitimate inputs that exceed the ranges of the circuit and cause corrupted outputs, and propose an improved design technique that completely avoids them. First, we propose a practical algorithm to induce overflow events in a CKKS circuit, i.e. we automatically craft legitimate inputs that exceed the design ranges within the circuit and cause corrupted outputs. As an example, our algorithm can quickly corrupt around 47% of benign inputs in a CIFAR10 neural network. Second, we propose an end-to-end formal verification approach that constructs executable CKKS circuits. These circuits are guaranteed to be overflow-free and come with certified error bounds on the output difference w.r.t. the original neural network. Our experiments demonstrate that our approach supports a larger set of neural network architectures than prior certified techniques, while also delivering executable CKKS artifacts.

Abstract:The popular Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) scheme enables efficient private inference in neural networks by evaluating them on encrypted data. Since CKKS only supports addition, multiplication, and array rotation operations, turning neural networks into CKKS circuits requires approximating all activation functions (e.g. ReLU) with polynomials over fixed input ranges. Traditionally, these ranges are estimated via heuristic sampling techniques. In this paper, we empirically demonstrate that sampled ranges leave the CKKS network exposed to overflow events, i.e. legitimate inputs that exceed the ranges of the circuit and cause corrupted outputs, and propose an improved design technique that completely avoids them. First, we propose a practical algorithm to induce overflow events in a CKKS circuit, i.e. we automatically craft legitimate inputs that exceed the design ranges within the circuit and cause corrupted outputs. As an example, our algorithm can quickly corrupt around 47% of benign inputs in a CIFAR10 neural network. Second, we propose an end-to-end formal verification approach that constructs executable CKKS circuits. These circuits are guaranteed to be overflow-free and come with certified error bounds on the output difference w.r.t. the original neural network. Our experiments demonstrate that our approach supports a larger set of neural network architectures than prior certified techniques, while also delivering executable CKKS artifacts.

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2605.23096 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2605.23096v2 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.23096 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Encrypted Neural Networks without Overflows

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