aiqbench analysis
This research proposes Stratified Inoculation Prompting (SIP), a technique designed to mitigate backdoor triggers in language models while better preserving desired capabilities compared to standard inoculation methods. By leveraging a small clean subset of training data, SIP demonstrates improved selective generalization and lower emergent misalignment rates across various harmful-advice scenarios. The findings offer a significant advancement for AI safety protocols aimed at reducing unwanted model behaviors without compromising core functionality.
Don't Inoculate Everything: Stratified Inoculation Prompting Narrows Backdoor Triggers and Preserves Desired Traits
arXiv:2609.35356v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Supervised fine-tuning can teach language models undesired behaviours alongside desired ones. Inoculation prompting (IP) aims to limit unwanted generalisation by requesting the undesired behaviour during training and removing the request at inference. However, undesired behaviour can still appear under unrelated prompts. IP can also hinder learning of the desired behaviour. We address these limitations in settings where both behaviours co-occur in most training examples, so filtering out examples with undesired behaviour leaves only a small clean subset. We introduce stratified inoculation prompting (SIP). SIP leverages a small clean subset to demonstrate that desired behaviour should persist without the undesired one across different contexts. SIP oversamples these clean examples under diverse non-eliciting prompts while inoculating the rest. SIP substantially reduces expression of undesired behaviour while preserving more of the desired behaviour than IP. These gains persist even when we extend IP to oversample the same clean subset at the same rate as SIP. Moreover, SIP yields lower emergent misalignment rates in all harmful-advice setups we tested. SIP can be further extended to limit the undesired behaviour even under prompts that explicitly request it. We introduce backdoor dilution, which weakens expression under the inoculation prompt, and password-locked inoculation, which concentrates elicitation on a designated password. Taken together, our findings show that changing the training contexts for a small clean subset can significantly improve selective generalisation.
Abstract:Supervised fine-tuning can teach language models undesired behaviours alongside desired ones. Inoculation prompting (IP) aims to limit unwanted generalisation by requesting the undesired behaviour during training and removing the request at inference. However, undesired behaviour can still appear under unrelated prompts. IP can also hinder learning of the desired behaviour. We address these limitations in settings where both behaviours co-occur in most training examples, so filtering out examples with undesired behaviour leaves only a small clean subset. We introduce stratified inoculation prompting (SIP). SIP leverages a small clean subset to demonstrate that desired behaviour should persist without the undesired one across different contexts. SIP oversamples these clean examples under diverse non-eliciting prompts while inoculating the rest. SIP substantially reduces expression of undesired behaviour while preserving more of the desired behaviour than IP. These gains persist even when we extend IP to oversample the same clean subset at the same rate as SIP. Moreover, SIP yields lower emergent misalignment rates in all harmful-advice setups we tested. SIP can be further extended to limit the undesired behaviour even under prompts that explicitly request it. We introduce backdoor dilution, which weakens expression under the inoculation prompt, and password-locked inoculation, which concentrates elicitation on a designated password. Taken together, our findings show that changing the training contexts for a small clean subset can significantly improve selective generalisation.
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2609.35356 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2609.35356v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.35356 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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