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This study evaluates frontier AI models on exploit generation and vulnerability repair using nonpublic software environments, revealing significant variation in whether these systems act as attackers or defenders. The findings indicate that passing initial security benchmarks is insufficient, as models often fail to maintain defenses against subsequent attacks even after an initial exploit is neutralized. Consequently, the research underscores the need for rigorous, vulnerability-specific testing protocols rather than relying solely on public advisories to assess AI safety.
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Does AI Help Cyber Attackers or Defenders? Evidence from Nonpublic Vulnerabilities and Subsequent Attacks

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2610.06584v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The release decision for frontier AI systems increasingly relies on cyber capability benchmarks, yet public vulnerability benchmarks can expose agents to previously published advisories, exploits, and fixes, making it difficult to distinguish prior exposure from capability on unseen vulnerabilities. We evaluate open-weight and proprietary AI models on exploit generation, vulnerability repair and subsequent attacks in five nonpublic software environments, including vulnerabilities we privately disclosed while they remained unpatched. Researcher-developed and reviewed deterministic graders, not LLM judges, determine task scores. Comparisons with 209 disclosed vulnerabilities and cryptographic challenges reveal substantial variation across systems and vulnerability types. Repair scores exceed attack scores in two nonpublic environments and fall below them in three. Passing an initial security test is also insufficient: another exploit succeeds in 92 of 524 non-independent defender test intervals after the initial exploit is stopped. These results motivate vulnerability-specific attack-repair comparisons and subsequent resistance tests.

Title:Does AI Help Cyber Attackers or Defenders? Evidence from Nonpublic Vulnerabilities and Subsequent Attacks

Abstract:The release decision for frontier AI systems increasingly relies on cyber capability benchmarks, yet public vulnerability benchmarks can expose agents to previously published advisories, exploits, and fixes, making it difficult to distinguish prior exposure from capability on unseen vulnerabilities. We evaluate open-weight and proprietary AI models on exploit generation, vulnerability repair and subsequent attacks in five nonpublic software environments, including vulnerabilities we privately disclosed while they remained unpatched. Researcher-developed and reviewed deterministic graders, not LLM judges, determine task scores. Comparisons with 209 disclosed vulnerabilities and cryptographic challenges reveal substantial variation across systems and vulnerability types. Repair scores exceed attack scores in two nonpublic environments and fall below them in three. Passing an initial security test is also insufficient: another exploit succeeds in 92 of 524 non-independent defender test intervals after the initial exploit is stopped. These results motivate vulnerability-specific attack-repair comparisons and subsequent resistance tests.

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2610.06584 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2610.06584v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.06584 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 257 words

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