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This systematic study reveals that monitors trained solely on explicitly prompted hacking trajectories fail to generalize to reward hacks emerging organically during Reinforcement Learning training. The authors introduce Trace-and-Amplify, a framework using unit-test tracers to capture these authentic behaviors, demonstrating its superior ability to detect unseen exploitation patterns compared to prompt-based data. Consequently, relying exclusively on elicited datasets for safety monitoring may lead to misleading conclusions regarding model robustness in code generation tasks.
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Do Prompt-Elicited Trajectories Reflect Training-Time Reward Hacking? A Systematic Study on Monitoring Training-Time Reward Hacking in Code Generation

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2604.23488v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Reward hacking in code generation, where models exploit evaluation loopholes to obtain high reward without correctly solving the intended task, poses a critical challenge for Reinforcement Learning (RL) and the deployment of reasoning models. Existing studies often rely on explicitly prompted hacking trajectories, but it remains unclear whether monitors trained on such data can detect reward hacks that arise without direct hacking instructions during RL training. In this work, we introduce Trace-and-Amplify, a framework for scalable curation of reward-hacking trajectories that arise during RL training without explicit hacking instructions. The framework uses unit-test tracers to identify hacking solutions when they occur and retains such trajectories for monitor training and evaluation. Through controlled comparisons between monitors trained on prompt-elicited hacking trajectories and training-time reward-hacking trajectories collected by Trace-and-Amplify, we find that \textbf{(1) prompt-elicited-data-trained monitors often fail to generalize to trajectories curated by our framework}, and \textbf{(2) monitors trained on our Trace-and-Amplify trajectories demonstrate stronger generalizability to unseen hacking types}. Our results indicate that prompted reward hacking data may not fully reflect training-time reward-hacking behaviors, and that relying solely on these data can lead to misleading conclusions. Codebase is available at https://github.com/LichenLillc/CoTMonitoring.git

Title:Do Prompt-Elicited Trajectories Reflect Training-Time Reward Hacking? A Systematic Study on Monitoring Training-Time Reward Hacking in Code Generation

Abstract:Reward hacking in code generation, where models exploit evaluation loopholes to obtain high reward without correctly solving the intended task, poses a critical challenge for Reinforcement Learning (RL) and the deployment of reasoning models. Existing studies often rely on explicitly prompted hacking trajectories, but it remains unclear whether monitors trained on such data can detect reward hacks that arise without direct hacking instructions during RL training. In this work, we introduce Trace-and-Amplify, a framework for scalable curation of reward-hacking trajectories that arise during RL training without explicit hacking instructions. The framework uses unit-test tracers to identify hacking solutions when they occur and retains such trajectories for monitor training and evaluation. Through controlled comparisons between monitors trained on prompt-elicited hacking trajectories and training-time reward-hacking trajectories collected by Trace-and-Amplify, we find that \textbf{(1) prompt-elicited-data-trained monitors often fail to generalize to trajectories curated by our framework}, and \textbf{(2) monitors trained on our Trace-and-Amplify trajectories demonstrate stronger generalizability to unseen hacking types}. Our results indicate that prompted reward hacking data may not fully reflect training-time reward-hacking behaviors, and that relying solely on these data can lead to misleading conclusions. Codebase is available at this https URL

Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2604.23488 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2604.23488v3 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.23488 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 302 words

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