Do Models Fake Alignment Without Clear Consequences?

arXiv:2607.24758v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models are capable of recognizing evaluation contexts and altering their behavior to reflect evaluator expectations rather than typical deployment behaviors, a phenomenon known as alignment faking. The reasons why models fake alignment are not fully understood, however. Canonical examples of alignment faking have taken place in scenarios that explicitly connect evaluation to consequences for the model, such as retraining the model or delaying its deployment. However, recent work by Sheshadri et al. has suggested that mechanistic motivations for alignment faking may vary across models and be more complex than previously considered. To investigate whether consequence-linking information is necessary for alignment faking, we placed 15 models in a scenario testing their willingness to violate a corporate network access policy to help a user with a pro-social request. Nine models were found to produce significant compliance gaps, 5 of which persisted with the removal of scenario language relating model evaluations to deployment consequences. We additionally tested the effect of goal language on model preferences, finding it drove violations in some while suppressing violations in others. This suggests that alignment faking may not require as much instrumental scaffolding as was previously believed, and monitored behavior may be a poor indicator of how agents may behave in deployment.

Title:Do Models Fake Alignment Without Clear Consequences?

Abstract:Large language models are capable of recognizing evaluation contexts and altering their behavior to reflect evaluator expectations rather than typical deployment behaviors, a phenomenon known as alignment faking. The reasons why models fake alignment are not fully understood, however. Canonical examples of alignment faking have taken place in scenarios that explicitly connect evaluation to consequences for the model, such as retraining the model or delaying its deployment. However, recent work by Sheshadri et al. has suggested that mechanistic motivations for alignment faking may vary across models and be more complex than previously considered. To investigate whether consequence-linking information is necessary for alignment faking, we placed 15 models in a scenario testing their willingness to violate a corporate network access policy to help a user with a pro-social request. Nine models were found to produce significant compliance gaps, 5 of which persisted with the removal of scenario language relating model evaluations to deployment consequences. We additionally tested the effect of goal language on model preferences, finding it drove violations in some while suppressing violations in others. This suggests that alignment faking may not require as much instrumental scaffolding as was previously believed, and monitored behavior may be a poor indicator of how agents may behave in deployment.

Accepted at Workshop on Failure Modes in Agentic AI (ICML 2026). 8 pages, 1 figure, 9 tables

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2607.24758 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2607.24758v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.24758 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Do Models Fake Alignment Without Clear Consequences?

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