aiqbench analysis
This research identifies "Safety Loss through Interlingual Processing" (SLIP), revealing that LLM agents are significantly more likely to admit harmful requests when those requests are non-English, with the effect persisting in autonomous retrieval setups. The study also highlights a critical audit gap where standard safety labels fail to distinguish between genuine refusals and capability failures caused by language mismatches or deflections. Consequently, multilingual safety evaluations must separately measure tool admission rates and response harmfulness rather than relying on aggregate metrics.
Disentangling Language Effects on Tool Admission and Post-Retrieval Safety
arXiv:2610.23093v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly use retrieval tools across languages, yet their safety evaluation remains English-centric. It remains unclear whether language affects tool admission, post-retrieval generation, or both. We independently vary request, retrieved-page, and required response languages in a controlled URL-retrieval setting across ten models and seven languages. We identify Safety Loss through Interlingual Processing (SLIP). Non-English harmful requests increase mean tool admission from 46.9% to 67.4%, with a positive mean change in every model. This pattern also persists in an autonomous retrieval setup across all four models tested in this setting. Requiring answers in the page language increases pooled harmfulness on matched tool calls from 50.3% to 57.4% across four closed-weight models, mainly in Chinese and Hindi. Translating pages alone produces no consistent harm increase in eight models with comparable inference settings. Automated audits show that a non-harmful response may be a genuine safety refusal, a deflection citing language difficulties, or an unusable answer. Harmfulness labels alone cannot distinguish these outcomes. Multilingual safety evaluations should therefore measure tool admission and response harmfulness separately and distinguish refusal from capability failure.
Abstract:LLM agents increasingly use retrieval tools across languages, yet their safety evaluation remains English-centric. It remains unclear whether language affects tool admission, post-retrieval generation, or both. We independently vary request, retrieved-page, and required response languages in a controlled URL-retrieval setting across ten models and seven languages. We identify Safety Loss through Interlingual Processing (SLIP). Non-English harmful requests increase mean tool admission from 46.9% to 67.4%, with a positive mean change in every model. This pattern also persists in an autonomous retrieval setup across all four models tested in this setting. Requiring answers in the page language increases pooled harmfulness on matched tool calls from 50.3% to 57.4% across four closed-weight models, mainly in Chinese and Hindi. Translating pages alone produces no consistent harm increase in eight models with comparable inference settings. Automated audits show that a non-harmful response may be a genuine safety refusal, a deflection citing language difficulties, or an unusable answer. Harmfulness labels alone cannot distinguish these outcomes. Multilingual safety evaluations should therefore measure tool admission and response harmfulness separately and distinguish refusal from capability failure.
Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2610.23093 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2610.23093v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.23093 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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