aiqbench analysis
DiscourseFlip introduces a novel black-box attack that exploits poisoned retrieval content to manipulate opinions across a holistic, multi-topic query network rather than isolated queries. By dynamically allocating a poisoning budget within a semantic graph, this agentic approach significantly outperforms existing methods while remaining difficult for users to detect. The findings highlight a critical vulnerability in current RAG defenses, suggesting that existing mitigation strategies are insufficient against coordinated, discourse-level influence campaigns.
DiscourseFlip: An Oblique Discourse-Level Opinion Manipulation Attack against Black-box Retrieval-Augmented Generation
arXiv:2606.01212v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are widely deployed and increasingly influential, but their reliance on external corpora exposes new security risks from poisoned retrieval content. Existing RAG attacks are largely focusing on individual queries or narrow topic-local query sets, which limits their practical reach and offers limited camouflage in real-world settings. In this paper, we introduce discourse-level opinion manipulation, a new threat model in which coordinated influence across a semantic query network induces opinion shifts over a holistic, multi-topic query space. We formalize this threat in a black-box setting and propose DiscourseFlip, an agentic, graph-guided attack that dynamically allocates a limited poisoning budget to maximize discourse-level opinion deviation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DiscourseFlip consistently induces targeted opinion shifts across the contextualized query network and significantly outperforms existing baselines in terms of coverage and effectiveness. User studies further confirm that DiscourseFlip is effective while remaining well camouflaged from user detection. Moreover, systematic analyses show that existing mitigation strategies are ineffective against discourse-level manipulation, underscoring the urgent need for more robust and adaptive defenses to address discourse-level vulnerabilities.
Abstract:Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are widely deployed and increasingly influential, but their reliance on external corpora exposes new security risks from poisoned retrieval content. Existing RAG attacks are largely focusing on individual queries or narrow topic-local query sets, which limits their practical reach and offers limited camouflage in real-world settings. In this paper, we introduce discourse-level opinion manipulation, a new threat model in which coordinated influence across a semantic query network induces opinion shifts over a holistic, multi-topic query space. We formalize this threat in a black-box setting and propose DiscourseFlip, an agentic, graph-guided attack that dynamically allocates a limited poisoning budget to maximize discourse-level opinion deviation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DiscourseFlip consistently induces targeted opinion shifts across the contextualized query network and significantly outperforms existing baselines in terms of coverage and effectiveness. User studies further confirm that DiscourseFlip is effective while remaining well camouflaged from user detection. Moreover, systematic analyses show that existing mitigation strategies are ineffective against discourse-level manipulation, underscoring the urgent need for more robust and adaptive defenses to address discourse-level vulnerabilities.
Computation and Language (cs.CL); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Information Retrieval (cs.IR)
arXiv:2606.01212 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2606.01212v2 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.01212 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 278 words
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