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This research introduces DIME, a theoretically grounded framework that significantly improves membership inference attacks on diffusion models by leveraging the denoiser's implicit reconstruction error. By decomposing leakage into bias and local crowding terms, the method achieves superior performance with as few as two queries compared to existing heuristic approaches requiring tens of queries. The study also evaluates specific defenses against these powerful tests, highlighting critical vulnerabilities in current generative model privacy guarantees.
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DIME: Query-Efficient Framework for Membership Inference on Diffusion Models

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2608.22824v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Membership inference attacks expose whether individual records were used to train a model, yet existing attacks on diffusion models are largely heuristic and can require substantial query budgets. We introduce DIME (Denoiser Ideal Membership Error), a theoretically grounded and query-efficient framework for membership inference on diffusion models. Our starting point is an exact characterization of the optimal diffusion denoiser for a finite training set, which reveals that membership leakage is governed by the denoiser's implicit reconstruction error. This error decomposes into two complementary signals: a bias term, capturing reconstruction accuracy, and a previously unexplored local crowding term, capturing the geometry of nearby training examples. Both admit efficient estimators using only model queries, yielding a practical attack with as few as two queries. Across CIFAR-10/100, STL10-U, CelebA, and ImageNet, DIME consistently outperforms prior attacks at comparable or substantially lower query cost, improving TPR at 1% FPR by up to $3\times$; remarkably, its two-query variant can outperform existing 30-query baselines. Finally, we suggest, discuss, and evaluate specific defenses to counteract such powerful membership tests.

Abstract:Membership inference attacks expose whether individual records were used to train a model, yet existing attacks on diffusion models are largely heuristic and can require substantial query budgets. We introduce DIME (Denoiser Ideal Membership Error), a theoretically grounded and query-efficient framework for membership inference on diffusion models. Our starting point is an exact characterization of the optimal diffusion denoiser for a finite training set, which reveals that membership leakage is governed by the denoiser's implicit reconstruction error. This error decomposes into two complementary signals: a bias term, capturing reconstruction accuracy, and a previously unexplored local crowding term, capturing the geometry of nearby training examples. Both admit efficient estimators using only model queries, yielding a practical attack with as few as two queries. Across CIFAR-10/100, STL10-U, CelebA, and ImageNet, DIME consistently outperforms prior attacks at comparable or substantially lower query cost, improving TPR at 1% FPR by up to $3\times$; remarkably, its two-query variant can outperform existing 30-query baselines. Finally, we suggest, discuss, and evaluate specific defenses to counteract such powerful membership tests.

Machine Learning (cs.LG); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

arXiv:2608.22824 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2608.22824v1 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.22824 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 270 words

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