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This paper introduces DP-SPIN, a framework that enables differentially private aggregation of semantic concepts independent of the underlying data clusters, addressing limitations in existing cluster-based privacy methods like URANIA. By mapping records to fixed concept vectors and utilizing a trusted-curator model with public verification, it ensures robust privacy guarantees for predefined topics across diverse datasets such as consumer reviews and complaints. The approach is significant for advancing trustworthy AI summarization where maintaining specific semantic integrity under strict privacy constraints is critical.
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Differentially Private Semantic Plans for Aggregate Insight Generation

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2609.16283v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: \texttt{URANIA} provides end-to-end differential privacy (DP) for summaries of data-dependent clusters. However, its cluster--keyword release does not directly provide collection-wide aggregates for semantic concepts defined independently of the protected corpus. Records may express several concepts, records expressing the same concept may be assigned to different clusters, and cluster identities need not correspond across analyses. Consequently, cluster-level statistics do not directly provide comparable measurements of predefined concepts across collections or repeated analyses. We introduce \texttt{DP-SPIN}, a trusted-curator framework for aggregate measurement and summarization over semantic concepts fixed independently of the protected target records. Each record is mapped to a bounded sparse nonnegative vector over these concepts, whose sum forms a semantic sketch. A differentially private mechanism releases a semantic plan containing admitted concepts and noisy masses; normalized semantic-support values and support bins are obtained by post-processing. For user-level privacy, each user's aggregate contribution is clipped to a fixed bound. The language model receives only the plan and fixed decoding instructions, while a public verifier checks concept mentions, reported values, comparisons, and rank claims against the released plan. The final summary is differentially private by post-processing. We establish record- and user-level DP guarantees under add/drop and replacement adjacency. We evaluate \texttt{DP-SPIN} under record-level privacy on CFPB complaint narratives, Amazon All Beauty reviews, and Yelp restaurant reviews, and under user-level privacy on Amazon and Yelp. We compare \texttt{DP-SPIN} with non-private plan and summary references, DP keyword and category histogram baselines, and a \texttt{URANIA}-style baseline with a fixed public keyword vocabulary.

Abstract:\texttt{URANIA} provides end-to-end differential privacy (DP) for summaries of data-dependent clusters. However, its cluster--keyword release does not directly provide collection-wide aggregates for semantic concepts defined independently of the protected corpus. Records may express several concepts, records expressing the same concept may be assigned to different clusters, and cluster identities need not correspond across analyses. Consequently, cluster-level statistics do not directly provide comparable measurements of predefined concepts across collections or repeated analyses. We introduce \texttt{DP-SPIN}, a trusted-curator framework for aggregate measurement and summarization over semantic concepts fixed independently of the protected target records. Each record is mapped to a bounded sparse nonnegative vector over these concepts, whose sum forms a semantic sketch. A differentially private mechanism releases a semantic plan containing admitted concepts and noisy masses; normalized semantic-support values and support bins are obtained by post-processing. For user-level privacy, each user's aggregate contribution is clipped to a fixed bound. The language model receives only the plan and fixed decoding instructions, while a public verifier checks concept mentions, reported values, comparisons, and rank claims against the released plan. The final summary is differentially private by post-processing. We establish record- and user-level DP guarantees under add/drop and replacement adjacency. We evaluate \texttt{DP-SPIN} under record-level privacy on CFPB complaint narratives, Amazon All Beauty reviews, and Yelp restaurant reviews, and under user-level privacy on Amazon and Yelp. We compare \texttt{DP-SPIN} with non-private plan and summary references, DP keyword and category histogram baselines, and a \texttt{URANIA}-style baseline with a fixed public keyword vocabulary.

Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2609.16283 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2609.16283v1 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.16283 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 341 words

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