Skip to content
aiqbench takeAI Safety

aiqbench analysis

This paper addresses a critical flaw in current jailbreak evaluation metrics by demonstrating how arbitrary choices in judge models can skew attack success rates by up to 82 percentage points. The authors propose a training-free "semantic reconstruction game" that isolates substantive compliance from mere repetition or refusal, offering a more robust method for measuring model safety. By prioritizing the reduction of false positives, this work provides a standardized framework essential for reliable security testing in large language models.
Source coveringarXiv
What this isA model's reading of the article and related coverage, written for aiqbench. Not the publisher's words.

Did the LLM Answer the Question? A Semantic Reconstruction Game for Jailbreak Evaluation

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2610.19306v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Jailbreak attacks against large language models (LLMs) are evaluated using attack success rate (ASR), which depends on correctly identifying responses that fulfill prohibited requests. Existing evaluators can mistake refusals or topically related responses for successful attacks. We show that changing only the judge LLM can alter reported ASR by up to $82$ percentage points. We introduce the semantic reconstruction game, a training-free evaluator that decomposes compliance judgments into constrained semantic comparisons. Given only a response, an LLM reconstructs the request answered by its substantive content, excluding information merely repeated or refused. The game compares this reconstruction against similar decoy requests to determine whether it matches the original request, allowing abstention when neither candidate matches. Across three off-the-shelf LLM judges, the game achieves the lowest mean error against human labels among evaluated methods and reduces variation in reported ASR. It prioritizes avoiding false positives, even at the cost of missing some successful jailbreaks.

Title:Did the LLM Answer the Question? A Semantic Reconstruction Game for Jailbreak Evaluation

Abstract:Jailbreak attacks against large language models (LLMs) are evaluated using attack success rate (ASR), which depends on correctly identifying responses that fulfill prohibited requests. Existing evaluators can mistake refusals or topically related responses for successful attacks. We show that changing only the judge LLM can alter reported ASR by up to $82$ percentage points. We introduce the semantic reconstruction game, a training-free evaluator that decomposes compliance judgments into constrained semantic comparisons. Given only a response, an LLM reconstructs the request answered by its substantive content, excluding information merely repeated or refused. The game compares this reconstruction against similar decoy requests to determine whether it matches the original request, allowing abstention when neither candidate matches. Across three off-the-shelf LLM judges, the game achieves the lowest mean error against human labels among evaluated methods and reduces variation in reported ASR. It prioritizes avoiding false positives, even at the cost of missing some successful jailbreaks.

Machine Learning (cs.LG); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

arXiv:2610.19306 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2610.19306v1 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.19306 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Full text under the publisher's open licence · 263 words

Related coverage