aiqbench analysis
This lecture note establishes a theoretical framework linking decision-theoretic objectives to specific uncertainty representations, such as posterior distributions for risk-neutral agents or prediction sets for risk-averse ones. It further addresses epistemic uncertainty in unknown environments by proposing complementary approaches including calibration, credal sets with distributionally robust optimization, and Bayesian inference. These findings are critical for advancing reliable AI systems that must act optimally under varying levels of confidence and environmental knowledge.
Decision Making Needs Uncertainty Quantification [Lecture Notes]
arXiv:2607.14407v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Many signal processing systems ultimately exist to {act}. Whenever the state variable that determines the action to be taken by a decision maker, or agent, is uncertain, the way that uncertainty is represented decides how well the agent performs and how much its performance can be trusted. This lecture note develops, from first principles and within a single decision-theoretic setting, the link between the {objective} and the knowledge of an agent and the form of uncertainty representation that is sufficient to act optimally. To start, assuming a known environment distribution, we show that a risk-neutral agent needs the posterior distribution over the state, whereas a risk-averse agent can rely without loss of optimality on a {prediction set} and a worst-case decision rule. We then turn to the case in which the environment is unknown, and identify three complementary approaches to address the resulting epistemic uncertainty: calibration of a fixed predictor, credal (ambiguity) sets with distributionally robust optimization, and Bayesian inference over model parameters. The common thread is that reliable decisions require an uncertainty representation matched to the decision objective and to the knowledge profile of the agent, together with a guarantee that certifies the utility the agent will actually obtain.
Abstract:Many signal processing systems ultimately exist to {act}. Whenever the state variable that determines the action to be taken by a decision maker, or agent, is uncertain, the way that uncertainty is represented decides how well the agent performs and how much its performance can be trusted. This lecture note develops, from first principles and within a single decision-theoretic setting, the link between the {objective} and the knowledge of an agent and the form of uncertainty representation that is sufficient to act optimally. To start, assuming a known environment distribution, we show that a risk-neutral agent needs the posterior distribution over the state, whereas a risk-averse agent can rely without loss of optimality on a {prediction set} and a worst-case decision rule. We then turn to the case in which the environment is unknown, and identify three complementary approaches to address the resulting epistemic uncertainty: calibration of a fixed predictor, credal (ambiguity) sets with distributionally robust optimization, and Bayesian inference over model parameters. The common thread is that reliable decisions require an uncertainty representation matched to the decision objective and to the knowledge profile of the agent, together with a guarantee that certifies the utility the agent will actually obtain.
Information Theory (cs.IT); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2607.14407 [cs.IT]
(or arXiv:2607.14407v2 [cs.IT] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.14407 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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