aiqbench analysis
This rapid exploitation of LMDeploy highlights a critical security gap in open-source AI infrastructure, where SSRF vulnerabilities allow attackers to weaponize vision-LLM endpoints for internal network reconnaissance. The incident underscores the urgent need for rigorous input validation and scheme/host checks in model-serving toolkits before public disclosure. For practitioners deploying these systems, immediate patching and hardened network segmentation are essential to prevent similar lateral movement attacks.
CVE-2026-33626: How attackers exploited LMDeploy LLM Inference Engines in 12 hours

CVE-2026-33626 in LMDeploy was exploited within 12 hours of disclosure, enabling attackers to use a vision-LLM endpoint for SSRF-based internal network scanning, cloud metadata access, and service enumeration.
On April 21, 2026, GitHub published GHSA-6w67-hwm5-92mq, later assigned CVE-2026-33626, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in LMDeploy. LMDeploy is a toolkit for serving vision-language and text large language models (LLMs) developed by Shanghai AI Laboratory, InternLM. Within 12 hours and 31 minutes of its publication on the main GitHub advisory page, the Sysdig Threat Research Team (TRT) observed the first LMDeploy exploitation attempt against our honeypot fleet. The attacker did not simply validate the bug and move on. Instead, over a single eight-minute session, they used the vision-language image loader as a generic HTTP SSRF primitive to port-scan the internal network behind the model server: AWS Instance Metadata Service (IMDS), Redis, MySQL, a secondary HTTP administrative interface, and an out-of-band (OOB) DNS exfiltration endpoint. The Sysdig TRT deployed a honeypot running a vulnerable LMDeploy instance shortly after the advisory went live. The malicious activity that followed shows how an attacker weaponizes a narrowly described SSRF against an AI-infrastructure tool such as LMDeploy. First exploitation attempt observed (from 103.116.72.119) First exploitation attempt observed (from…
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