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This research addresses a critical vulnerability in unified multimodal models (UMMs) where existing adversarial defenses fail due to the model's internal fusion of visual understanding and generation pathways. The authors propose CCS, a novel framework that simultaneously disrupts both branches' feature representations to prevent unauthorized identity recovery during image editing tasks. By forcing cross-branch incompatibility rather than targeting single components, this method offers a more robust shield against deepfake-style manipulations in advanced generative systems.
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Cross-Branch Conflict as a Shield: Safeguarding Facial Identities in Unified Multimodal Image Editing

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2607.16898v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Unified multimodal models (UMMs) have recently demonstrated powerful instruction-based image editing capabilities, but they also raise serious concerns about unauthorized manipulation of personal portraits. Existing adversarial protection methods are mainly designed for either visual understanding or image generation models and often become ineffective when transferred to UMMs, which process an image through multiple complementary visual pathways. In this work, we first conduct a feature-level analysis of unified image editing. We observe that the ViT-based understanding branch and the VAE-based generation branch exhibit non-trivial structural agreement for the same input image. Although perturbing an individual branch can reduce this agreement and induce intermediate hidden-state deviations, such effects are asymmetric and gradually attenuated during multimodal fusion and generation. These observations reveal that single-branch feature distortion is insufficient for consistently disrupting unified image editing. Motivated by this finding, we propose CCS, a unified adversarial protection framework that jointly drives the ViT and VAE representations away from their clean counterparts while explicitly disrupting their cross-branch compatibility through linear CKA. By simultaneously removing stable information from both visual pathways and creating incompatible visual contexts, CCS prevents the UMM from recovering reliable identity information during editing. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CCS consistently outperforms existing protection methods in suppressing identity-preserving edits.

Abstract:Unified multimodal models (UMMs) have recently demonstrated powerful instruction-based image editing capabilities, but they also raise serious concerns about unauthorized manipulation of personal portraits. Existing adversarial protection methods are mainly designed for either visual understanding or image generation models and often become ineffective when transferred to UMMs, which process an image through multiple complementary visual pathways. In this work, we first conduct a feature-level analysis of unified image editing. We observe that the ViT-based understanding branch and the VAE-based generation branch exhibit non-trivial structural agreement for the same input image. Although perturbing an individual branch can reduce this agreement and induce intermediate hidden-state deviations, such effects are asymmetric and gradually attenuated during multimodal fusion and generation. These observations reveal that single-branch feature distortion is insufficient for consistently disrupting unified image editing. Motivated by this finding, we propose CCS, a unified adversarial protection framework that jointly drives the ViT and VAE representations away from their clean counterparts while explicitly disrupting their cross-branch compatibility through linear CKA. By simultaneously removing stable information from both visual pathways and creating incompatible visual contexts, CCS prevents the UMM from recovering reliable identity information during editing. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CCS consistently outperforms existing protection methods in suppressing identity-preserving edits.

Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

arXiv:2607.16898 [cs.CV]

(or arXiv:2607.16898v1 [cs.CV] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.16898 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 309 words

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