aiqbench analysis
This research addresses the cost and privacy challenges inherent in deploying LLM agents that draft emails, proposing a local-first enforcement layer using contract-conditioned rewriting. By shifting repair tasks to a cheaper local model like Gemma while retaining a remote checker for high-risk scenarios, the method significantly reduces data leakage under strategic attacks without inflating operational costs. The approach offers a practical framework for securing delegated communication agents against sophisticated information extraction attempts.
Cost-Efficient Privacy Enforcement for Email-Generating LLM Agents under Strategic Information Requests
arXiv:2610.18007v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents now act as delegated communication intermediaries: they read private context, draft messages, and send externally visible emails on behalf of a user. Existing checker-repair defenses can reduce inappropriate disclosure, but they rely on repeated calls to a remote action LLM (the model that drafts and repairs the email) and a remote checker LLM whenever a draft fails validation. This creates a cost problem as well as a privacy problem, especially when a requester strategically asks for exact values, raw records, source evidence, or other details that induce leakage-heavy drafts. We propose local contract-conditioned rewriting as a cost-efficient enforcement layer for email-generating agents. The mechanism intercepts an outgoing draft, constructs an information-release contract that specifies what to preserve, generalize, and forbid, rewrites the draft with a local Gemma rewriter, and selectively invokes a final PrivacyChecker. Across extensive email tasks under normal prompts and attack prompts that operationalize strategic information requests, Gemma + Checker reduces normal-prompt leakage from 11.41% to 4.03% while improving UsableRate (satisfied or partially satisfied outputs) from 85.2% to 92.6%. Under the strategic attack-prompt condition, it reduces leakage from 28.19% to 18.79% and reduces checker-only cost amplification from 1.32x to 1.02x. Offline replay ablation shows that the full contract reduces leakage relative to generic Gemma rewriting by 36.3% under normal prompts and 54.1% under attack prompts. These results support a local-first privacy enforcement design: move repair to a cheaper trusted local layer when possible, but retain the checker as the final semantic gate for high-risk sends.
Abstract:LLM agents now act as delegated communication intermediaries: they read private context, draft messages, and send externally visible emails on behalf of a user. Existing checker-repair defenses can reduce inappropriate disclosure, but they rely on repeated calls to a remote action LLM (the model that drafts and repairs the email) and a remote checker LLM whenever a draft fails validation. This creates a cost problem as well as a privacy problem, especially when a requester strategically asks for exact values, raw records, source evidence, or other details that induce leakage-heavy drafts. We propose local contract-conditioned rewriting as a cost-efficient enforcement layer for email-generating agents. The mechanism intercepts an outgoing draft, constructs an information-release contract that specifies what to preserve, generalize, and forbid, rewrites the draft with a local Gemma rewriter, and selectively invokes a final PrivacyChecker. Across extensive email tasks under normal prompts and attack prompts that operationalize strategic information requests, Gemma + Checker reduces normal-prompt leakage from 11.41% to 4.03% while improving UsableRate (satisfied or partially satisfied outputs) from 85.2% to 92.6%. Under the strategic attack-prompt condition, it reduces leakage from 28.19% to 18.79% and reduces checker-only cost amplification from 1.32x to 1.02x. Offline replay ablation shows that the full contract reduces leakage relative to generic Gemma rewriting by 36.3% under normal prompts and 54.1% under attack prompts. These results support a local-first privacy enforcement design: move repair to a cheaper trusted local layer when possible, but retain the checker as the final semantic gate for high-risk sends.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2610.18007 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2610.18007v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.18007 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 347 words
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