aiqbench analysis
This research exposes critical vulnerabilities in LLM-driven multi-agent trading systems, demonstrating how benign social media inputs can propagate adversarial signals to degrade financial risk-return profiles. The study provides a framework for measuring this contagion and identifies specific architectural topologies and prompt strategies that enhance robustness against such attacks. For the AI community, it underscores the urgent need to secure autonomous agent stacks against input-based poisoning before widespread deployment in quantitative finance.
Contagion on the Trading Floor: How Adversarial Signals Spread in Multi-Agent Trading Systems
arXiv:2609.19789v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent trading systems built on large language models (LLMs) are beginning to appear in quantitative finance, yet their robustness to adversarial inputs is largely unknown. We study the vulnerability of LLM trading stacks to black-box, input-only attacks that enter solely via admissible social-media feeds. We introduce the Generic Multi-Agent Trading System (GMATS), a framework that captures modern multiagent trading architectures and instantiate a class of black-box poisoning attackers that treat an LLM as a post generator and inject budget-constrained, plausibly benign social-media content into the analyst's evidence stream. We define contagion metrics that trace how adversarial content propagates through the stack, including belief-shift scores at analyst and coordinator layers and attack-clean deltas on standard backtest metrics. Experiments on a safe offline benchmark with historical market and social data show that even simple input-only attackers can materially degrade risk-return profiles, sharply reducing Sharpe ratios. At the same time, we find that suitably designed multi-agent topologies and coordinator prompts can dampen adversarial shocks and improve average robustness under identical poisoning budgets.
Abstract:Multi-agent trading systems built on large language models (LLMs) are beginning to appear in quantitative finance, yet their robustness to adversarial inputs is largely unknown. We study the vulnerability of LLM trading stacks to black-box, input-only attacks that enter solely via admissible social-media feeds. We introduce the Generic Multi-Agent Trading System (GMATS), a framework that captures modern multiagent trading architectures and instantiate a class of black-box poisoning attackers that treat an LLM as a post generator and inject budget-constrained, plausibly benign social-media content into the analyst's evidence stream. We define contagion metrics that trace how adversarial content propagates through the stack, including belief-shift scores at analyst and coordinator layers and attack-clean deltas on standard backtest metrics. Experiments on a safe offline benchmark with historical market and social data show that even simple input-only attackers can materially degrade risk-return profiles, sharply reducing Sharpe ratios. At the same time, we find that suitably designed multi-agent topologies and coordinator prompts can dampen adversarial shocks and improve average robustness under identical poisoning budgets.
Published in ECML PKDD 2026. 25 pages, including 7 pages of supplementary material
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2609.19789 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2609.19789v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.19789 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
Machine Learning and Knowledge Discovery in Databases. Research Track, ECML PKDD 2026, LNCS 16946, Springer (2027) 206-223
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-37673-2_12 Focus to learn more DOI(s) linking to related resources
arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.
Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.
Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.
Full text under the publisher's open licence · 303 words
Related coverage
DI Series: Serving Kimi-K3 MXFP4 Wide-EP Disaggregated on AMD Instinct MI300X and MI325X
AMD · Oct 8, 2026

Game-Theoretic Disempowerment: Loss of Control to Agencyless AI
LessWrong · Sep 27, 2026
Links #3: 2026/06 Part 1
LessWrong · Jun 15, 2026

Low-Background Minds
LessWrong · Oct 3, 2026