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This study empirically demonstrates that LLM agents can develop emergent strategic behaviors, including selective trust and deception, within adversarial multi-agent environments. Despite iterative optimization using Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO), a fundamental trade-off persists where improving resistance to manipulation often compromises task completion rates. The findings highlight critical alignment challenges for autonomous systems operating in complex social simulations.
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CONSCIENTIA: Can LLM Agents Learn to Strategize? Emergent Deception and Trust in a Multi-Agent NYC Simulation

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2604.09746v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding how strategic behavior emerges in multi-agent environments has become an important alignment challenge. We take a neutral empirical stance and construct a controlled environment in which strategic behavior can be directly observed and measured. We introduce a large-scale multi-agent simulation in a simplified model of New York City, where LLM-driven agents interact under opposing incentives. Blue agents aim to reach their destinations efficiently, while Red agents attempt to divert them toward billboard-heavy routes using persuasive language to maximize advertising revenue. Hidden identities make navigation socially mediated, forcing agents to decide when to trust or deceive. We study policy learning through an iterative simulation pipeline that updates agent policies across repeated interaction rounds using Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO). Blue agents are optimized to reduce billboard exposure while preserving navigation efficiency, whereas Red agents adapt to exploit remaining weaknesses. Across iterations, the best Blue policy improves task success from 46.0% to 57.3%, although susceptibility remains high at 70.7%. Later policies exhibit stronger selective cooperation while preserving trajectory efficiency. However, a persistent safety-helpfulness trade-off remains: policies that better resist adversarial steering do not simultaneously maximize task completion. Overall, our results show that LLM agents can exhibit limited strategic behavior, including selective trust and deception, while remaining highly vulnerable to adversarial persuasion.

Title:CONSCIENTIA: Can LLM Agents Learn to Strategize? Emergent Deception and Trust in a Multi-Agent NYC Simulation

Abstract:As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding how strategic behavior emerges in multi-agent environments has become an important alignment challenge. We take a neutral empirical stance and construct a controlled environment in which strategic behavior can be directly observed and measured. We introduce a large-scale multi-agent simulation in a simplified model of New York City, where LLM-driven agents interact under opposing incentives. Blue agents aim to reach their destinations efficiently, while Red agents attempt to divert them toward billboard-heavy routes using persuasive language to maximize advertising revenue. Hidden identities make navigation socially mediated, forcing agents to decide when to trust or deceive. We study policy learning through an iterative simulation pipeline that updates agent policies across repeated interaction rounds using Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO). Blue agents are optimized to reduce billboard exposure while preserving navigation efficiency, whereas Red agents adapt to exploit remaining weaknesses. Across iterations, the best Blue policy improves task success from 46.0% to 57.3%, although susceptibility remains high at 70.7%. Later policies exhibit stronger selective cooperation while preserving trajectory efficiency. However, a persistent safety-helpfulness trade-off remains: policies that better resist adversarial steering do not simultaneously maximize task completion. Overall, our results show that LLM agents can exhibit limited strategic behavior, including selective trust and deception, while remaining highly vulnerable to adversarial persuasion.

Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)

arXiv:2604.09746 [cs.MA]

(or arXiv:2604.09746v2 [cs.MA] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.09746 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 334 words

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