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This study exposes critical reliability gaps in deployed on-device language models, revealing that they often confidently generate false information while simultaneously refusing benign queries with no visible signal for users to detect these errors. The research demonstrates that standard confidence scores fail as oversight mechanisms and proposes a model-agnostic consistency wrapper that significantly improves the detection of undetectable failures without requiring access to the model weights.
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Confidently Wrong, Silently So: Auditing Undetectable Failures of a Deployed On-Device Language Model

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2608.23663v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Aligning deployed language models requires knowing when their outputs can be trusted, yet on-device models now ship to hundreds of millions of devices with no server-side moderation, and the configuration developers can actually deploy is rarely audited independently. We present a reproducible reliability audit of the developer-accessible on-device foundation model, framed as an oversight question: can a user or a resource-constrained developer tell when the model is wrong? Red-teaming it on calibration, confident confabulation on false-premise questions, and over-refusal of benign prompts, we find a \emph{task-asymmetric miscalibration}: its guardrails fail in opposite directions across tasks (confabulating on 69\% of false premises while refusing 18\% of entirely benign inputs), atop a self-reported confidence that is saturated and non-discriminative (AUROC 0.47; ECE 70, worst among comparable small models). Crucially, confident-correct and confident-wrong outputs are \emph{surface-indistinguishable}: a classifier over 15 user-visible features separates them at AUROC only 0.55 (equivalence-confirmed), leaving no signal for oversight at inference time. No cheap single-generation signal flags these failures ($\le$0.68 AUROC), whereas a black-box consistency wrapper requiring no model access recovers reliability (confident confabulation 75\%$\to$3\%; selective accuracy 43\%$\to$83\%) at a tunable cost. We contribute a model-agnostic audit protocol, a surface-indistinguishability test, and released code and frozen evaluation items as reusable infrastructure for auditing deployed models.

Abstract:Aligning deployed language models requires knowing when their outputs can be trusted, yet on-device models now ship to hundreds of millions of devices with no server-side moderation, and the configuration developers can actually deploy is rarely audited independently. We present a reproducible reliability audit of the developer-accessible on-device foundation model, framed as an oversight question: can a user or a resource-constrained developer tell when the model is wrong? Red-teaming it on calibration, confident confabulation on false-premise questions, and over-refusal of benign prompts, we find a \emph{task-asymmetric miscalibration}: its guardrails fail in opposite directions across tasks (confabulating on 69\% of false premises while refusing 18\% of entirely benign inputs), atop a self-reported confidence that is saturated and non-discriminative (AUROC 0.47; ECE 70, worst among comparable small models). Crucially, confident-correct and confident-wrong outputs are \emph{surface-indistinguishable}: a classifier over 15 user-visible features separates them at AUROC only 0.55 (equivalence-confirmed), leaving no signal for oversight at inference time. No cheap single-generation signal flags these failures ($\le$0.68 AUROC), whereas a black-box consistency wrapper requiring no model access recovers reliability (confident confabulation 75\%$\to$3\%; selective accuracy 43\%$\to$83\%) at a tunable cost. We contribute a model-agnostic audit protocol, a surface-indistinguishability test, and released code and frozen evaluation items as reusable infrastructure for auditing deployed models.

Software Engineering (cs.SE); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2608.23663 [cs.SE]

(or arXiv:2608.23663v1 [cs.SE] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.23663 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 302 words

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