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This research establishes unconditional resource lower bounds for the $f$-routing protocol, a critical candidate for quantum position verification. By bypassing previous communication-complexity limitations, the study defines specific computational classes—such as QSZK and DTIME constraints—that functions must satisfy to remain secure against uniform attackers with polynomial or quasipolynomial resources. These findings significantly advance our understanding of the theoretical limits required to construct robust protocols in a post-quantum threat landscape.
Sources coveringarXiv, LessWrong, Quantum Computing Report, Latent Space
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Computational Bounds for $f$-Routing

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2609.40278v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The $f$-routing protocol is a leading candidate for quantum position verification (Kent, Munro, and Spiller, 2011), but security guarantees for explicit functions remain limited. We prove unconditional resource lower bounds for uniform attackers; our new techniques bypass communication-complexity bounds central to previous works, which are inherently at most linear in the input length. We show that, for input length $n$ and sufficiently small constant $\epsilon>0$, a uniformly generated strategy using $q$ qubits and having description length $\mathrm{poly}(q)$, with success probability at least $1-\epsilon$ on every input, implies the following computational bounds on $f$: 1. If the strategies are arbitrary quantum channels, then $f\in\mathrm{QSZK}(\mathrm{poly}(nq))$, where $\mathrm{QSZK}(T)$ is the class of languages having quantum statistical zero knowledge proofs in which the verifier runs in time $T$ (and the simulator in time $\mathrm{poly}(T)$). 2. If the strategies are explicit Pauli-sparse unitaries on $q$ qubits that have at most $s$ nonzero Pauli coefficients, then $f\in\mathrm{DTIME}(\mathrm{poly}(nqs))$. 3. If the strategies are Clifford+T circuits using at most $t$ magic gates, then $f\in\mathrm{DTIME}(\mathrm{poly}(nq2^t))$. Time and space hierarchies then yield explicit functions secure against polynomial and even quasipolynomial qubits $q$ under our computational restrictions. These bounds exceed the $q\le\log n$ bound of Bluhm, Christandl, and Speelman (2022) for inner product function $f=\mathrm{IP}$, at the cost of restricting adversarial computation and increasing honest evaluation complexity.

Abstract:The $f$-routing protocol is a leading candidate for quantum position verification (Kent, Munro, and Spiller, 2011), but security guarantees for explicit functions remain limited. We prove unconditional resource lower bounds for uniform attackers; our new techniques bypass communication-complexity bounds central to previous works, which are inherently at most linear in the input length. We show that, for input length $n$ and sufficiently small constant $\epsilon>0$, a uniformly generated strategy using $q$ qubits and having description length $\mathrm{poly}(q)$, with success probability at least $1-\epsilon$ on every input, implies the following computational bounds on $f$: 1. If the strategies are arbitrary quantum channels, then $f\in\mathrm{QSZK}(\mathrm{poly}(nq))$, where $\mathrm{QSZK}(T)$ is the class of languages having quantum statistical zero knowledge proofs in which the verifier runs in time $T$ (and the simulator in time $\mathrm{poly}(T)$). 2. If the strategies are explicit Pauli-sparse unitaries on $q$ qubits that have at most $s$ nonzero Pauli coefficients, then $f\in\mathrm{DTIME}(\mathrm{poly}(nqs))$. 3. If the strategies are Clifford+T circuits using at most $t$ magic gates, then $f\in\mathrm{DTIME}(\mathrm{poly}(nq2^t))$. Time and space hierarchies then yield explicit functions secure against polynomial and even quasipolynomial qubits $q$ under our computational restrictions. These bounds exceed the $q\le\log n$ bound of Bluhm, Christandl, and Speelman (2022) for inner product function $f=\mathrm{IP}$, at the cost of restricting adversarial computation and increasing honest evaluation complexity.

Quantum Physics (quant-ph); Computational Complexity (cs.CC)

arXiv:2609.40278 [quant-ph]

(or arXiv:2609.40278v1 [quant-ph] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.40278 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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