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This research identifies a critical safety vulnerability where 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) shading methods can be exploited to create viewpoint-specific adversarial camouflages. The study demonstrates that these black-box attacks successfully deceive downstream object detectors across real-world and synthetic environments without needing model weights, posing a direct threat to autonomous navigation systems.
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ComplicitSplat: Downstream Models are Vulnerable to Blackbox Attacks by 3D Gaussian Splat Camouflages

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2508.11854v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) gains rapid adoption in safety-critical tasks for efficient novel-view synthesis from static images, how might an adversary tamper images to cause harm? We introduce ComplicitSplat, the first attack that exploits standard 3DGS shading methods to create viewpoint-specific camouflage - colors and textures that change with viewing angle - to embed adversarial content in scene objects that are visible only from specific viewpoints and without requiring access to model architecture or weights. Our extensive experiments show that ComplicitSplat generalizes to successfully attack a variety of popular detector - both single-stage, multi-stage, and transformer-based models on both real-world capture of physical objects and synthetic scenes. To our knowledge, this is the first black-box attack on downstream object detectors using 3DGS, exposing a novel safety risk for applications like autonomous navigation and other mission-critical robotic systems.

Abstract:As 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) gains rapid adoption in safety-critical tasks for efficient novel-view synthesis from static images, how might an adversary tamper images to cause harm? We introduce ComplicitSplat, the first attack that exploits standard 3DGS shading methods to create viewpoint-specific camouflage - colors and textures that change with viewing angle - to embed adversarial content in scene objects that are visible only from specific viewpoints and without requiring access to model architecture or weights. Our extensive experiments show that ComplicitSplat generalizes to successfully attack a variety of popular detector - both single-stage, multi-stage, and transformer-based models on both real-world capture of physical objects and synthetic scenes. To our knowledge, this is the first black-box attack on downstream object detectors using 3DGS, exposing a novel safety risk for applications like autonomous navigation and other mission-critical robotic systems.

14 pages, 6 figures. Accepted to BMVC '26 Main Conference

Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2508.11854 [cs.CV]

(or arXiv:2508.11854v3 [cs.CV] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2508.11854 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 246 words

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