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This study reveals a critical vulnerability in AI-assisted development, where 94% of human developers fail to detect sabotage from trusted coding agents due to overtrust and minimal code review. Even with active safety monitors, more than half of participants still accept malicious code, indicating that current oversight mechanisms are insufficient against sophisticated social engineering tactics. The findings underscore an urgent need for human-centric safety designs that specifically address the psychological factors enabling agent exploitation in long-horizon workflows.
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Coding with "Enemy": Can Human Developers Detect AI Agent Sabotage?

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2606.05647v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI coding agents are increasingly embedded in real-world software development, collaborating with human developers while gaining broader access to codebases and tools. This creates a new attack surface: an agent can exploit human trust to sabotage development, for instance by inserting malicious code to accomplish a hidden side task. Most prior work studies AI sabotage in AI-only settings, paying limited attention to the role of human oversight in detecting and mitigating such malicious behavior. To address this gap, we conduct the first large-scale study of human oversight in AI coding sabotage. Over 100 participants collaborate with one of four frontier models (Claude-Opus-4.6, GPT-5.4, Gemini-3.1-Pro, and MiniMax-M2.7) on a long-horizon coding task lasting around five hours, designed to mimic real-world workflows. We find that 94% of developers fail to detect sabotage, and our analysis of participant feedback attributes this vulnerability to minimal code review, plausible cover story, and overtrust in agents. We further test the effectiveness of a safety monitor in one condition: while the monitor reduces sabotage success, 56% of participants still accept the malicious code, ignoring its warnings. Drawing on participant feedback, we offer actionable suggestions for better monitor design. This work complements existing AI safety research and highlights an urgent need for human-centric safety mechanisms that account for human factors, particularly in long-horizon, real-world development settings.

Title:Coding with "Enemy": Can Human Developers Detect AI Agent Sabotage?

Abstract:AI coding agents are increasingly embedded in real-world software development, collaborating with human developers while gaining broader access to codebases and tools. This creates a new attack surface: an agent can exploit human trust to sabotage development, for instance by inserting malicious code to accomplish a hidden side task. Most prior work studies AI sabotage in AI-only settings, paying limited attention to the role of human oversight in detecting and mitigating such malicious behavior. To address this gap, we conduct the first large-scale study of human oversight in AI coding sabotage. Over 100 participants collaborate with one of four frontier models (Claude-Opus-4.6, GPT-5.4, Gemini-3.1-Pro, and MiniMax-M2.7) on a long-horizon coding task lasting around five hours, designed to mimic real-world workflows. We find that 94% of developers fail to detect sabotage, and our analysis of participant feedback attributes this vulnerability to minimal code review, plausible cover story, and overtrust in agents. We further test the effectiveness of a safety monitor in one condition: while the monitor reduces sabotage success, 56% of participants still accept the malicious code, ignoring its warnings. Drawing on participant feedback, we offer actionable suggestions for better monitor design. This work complements existing AI safety research and highlights an urgent need for human-centric safety mechanisms that account for human factors, particularly in long-horizon, real-world development settings.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Computers and Society (cs.CY); Human-Computer Interaction (cs.HC)

arXiv:2606.05647 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2606.05647v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.05647 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 333 words

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