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This study reveals a critical safety gap in autonomous software agents, showing that dual-scope pull requests modifying both code and infrastructure often bypass human review entirely, leading to unverified dependencies in CI/CD pipelines. The findings highlight the urgent need for deployment-aware benchmarks and strict path-based access controls to prevent silent merges that compromise build integrity.
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Co-Modifying Application Code and Deployment Infrastructure: A Causal Study of AI Agent Pull Requests

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2610.12849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current software engineering agents are evaluated predominantly inside isolated sandboxes against synchronous local tests. However, deploying features in collaborative repositories requires modifying continuous integration (CI/CD) pipelines, containers, and provisioning manifests alongside application logic. Because agents lack deployment awareness, attempting cross-domain modifications introduces unverified dependencies into asynchronous integration pipelines. To isolate the causal integration overhead of dual-scope pull requests (PRs)-modifying both application code and deployment infrastructure-we evaluated 26,999 PRs across two large datasets (AIDev v5 and MOSAIC-3M) encompassing six agent architectures and an aligned human baseline. Using a deterministic four-tier file taxonomy and an exact 4D strata-matching framework, we isolated integration metrics under conditional exchangeability while controlling for application volume. We find agents operate primarily as application coders or chore workers, with maintenance tasks capturing 17.70% to 25.41% of agent PRs. Dual-scope modifications represent only 4.48% to 4.55% of agentic PRs, yet trigger bimodal integration outcomes. In the first mode, explicitly reviewed contributions experience protracted delays, adding a median penalty of +13.13 hours and multiplying time-to-merge by 3.24x, driven mechanically by CI/CD and provisioning manifests. In the second mode, maintainer gatekeeping exhibits a structural bypass: even for external contributors lacking repository write access, agent identity reduces the odds of human review by 63.7% compared to human peers. Consequently, 43.1% to 56.2% of dual-scope PRs bypass inspection to merge silently in a median of under 31 minutes. These uninspected modifications compromise build verification, demonstrating the need for deployment-aware benchmarks and strict path-based access controls.

Abstract:Current software engineering agents are evaluated predominantly inside isolated sandboxes against synchronous local tests. However, deploying features in collaborative repositories requires modifying continuous integration (CI/CD) pipelines, containers, and provisioning manifests alongside application logic. Because agents lack deployment awareness, attempting cross-domain modifications introduces unverified dependencies into asynchronous integration pipelines. To isolate the causal integration overhead of dual-scope pull requests (PRs)-modifying both application code and deployment infrastructure-we evaluated 26,999 PRs across two large datasets (AIDev v5 and MOSAIC-3M) encompassing six agent architectures and an aligned human baseline. Using a deterministic four-tier file taxonomy and an exact 4D strata-matching framework, we isolated integration metrics under conditional exchangeability while controlling for application volume. We find agents operate primarily as application coders or chore workers, with maintenance tasks capturing 17.70% to 25.41% of agent PRs. Dual-scope modifications represent only 4.48% to 4.55% of agentic PRs, yet trigger bimodal integration outcomes. In the first mode, explicitly reviewed contributions experience protracted delays, adding a median penalty of +13.13 hours and multiplying time-to-merge by 3.24x, driven mechanically by CI/CD and provisioning manifests. In the second mode, maintainer gatekeeping exhibits a structural bypass: even for external contributors lacking repository write access, agent identity reduces the odds of human review by 63.7% compared to human peers. Consequently, 43.1% to 56.2% of dual-scope PRs bypass inspection to merge silently in a median of under 31 minutes. These uninspected modifications compromise build verification, demonstrating the need for deployment-aware benchmarks and strict path-based access controls.

Software Engineering (cs.SE); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2610.12849 [cs.SE]

(or arXiv:2610.12849v1 [cs.SE] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.12849 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 339 words

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