aiqbench analysis
ChronosAttack reveals a critical vulnerability in asynchronous LLM agents where simple delays in tool response timing can alter decision outcomes without modifying content. The study demonstrates that the order of evidence arrival is an exploitable attack surface, with specific models showing susceptibility to targeted shifts or opposite-direction errors under bounded scheduling constraints. Defenses focusing on synchronization and maintaining strict observation order consistency are identified as necessary to mitigate these timing-based manipulation risks.
ChronosAttack: Adversarial Tool Scheduling Attacks on LLM Agents
arXiv:2609.27857v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents often process external tool responses as they arrive, making response timing part of the decision process. We introduce ChronosAttack, a delay-only scheduling attack that changes when authentic tool responses arrive without modifying, adding, removing, or accelerating them. Bounded delays can change the order of the same evidence and alter the final decision. We evaluate ChronosAttack on GPT-5.6 Sol, Gemini 3.6 Flash, DeepSeek V4 Flash, and Claude Sonnet 4.6. GPT-5.6 Sol and Claude show strong targeted shifts in vulnerable settings, Gemini shows large shifts in the opposite direction, and DeepSeek is more stable under the tested schedules. We also find that sequential agent state is not always required and that a single scheduling inversion can cause a large decision change. Synchronization and order-consistency defenses reduce attacker control over observation order. These results show that tool-response timing can itself form an attack surface in asynchronous LLM agents.
Abstract:Large language model (LLM) agents often process external tool responses as they arrive, making response timing part of the decision process. We introduce ChronosAttack, a delay-only scheduling attack that changes when authentic tool responses arrive without modifying, adding, removing, or accelerating them. Bounded delays can change the order of the same evidence and alter the final decision. We evaluate ChronosAttack on GPT-5.6 Sol, Gemini 3.6 Flash, DeepSeek V4 Flash, and Claude Sonnet 4.6. GPT-5.6 Sol and Claude show strong targeted shifts in vulnerable settings, Gemini shows large shifts in the opposite direction, and DeepSeek is more stable under the tested schedules. We also find that sequential agent state is not always required and that a single scheduling inversion can cause a large decision change. Synchronization and order-consistency defenses reduce attacker control over observation order. These results show that tool-response timing can itself form an attack surface in asynchronous LLM agents.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2609.27857 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2609.27857v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.27857 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 248 words
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