aiqbench analysis
LLM judges frequently exhibit an unsafe "Cherry-pick Override" failure, where they issue unauthorized directional commitments (SUPPORTS/REFUTES) on mixed-evidence claims instead of the authorized CONFLICTING verdict. Standard mitigation strategies like panel aggregation or confidence thresholding prove insufficient, as they either suppress necessary dissent or fail to distinguish between correct and incorrect directional outputs. The analysis suggests that robust evaluation requires a structural separation between verdict generation and commitment authorization, utilizing orthogonal evidence channels to prevent premature system commitments.
Cherry-pick Override: Unsafe Directional Commitment in LLM Judges under Mixed Evidence
arXiv:2606.07834v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM judges increasingly turn verdicts into system commitments. Under mixed evidence (claims with both supporting and refuting sources) this is unsafe: when the schema exposes CONFLICTING as the authorized non-directional verdict, returning SUPPORTS/REFUTES is an unauthorized directional commitment, a failure we name Cherry-pick Override (CCO). We define CCO under an explicit task contract and report it with a same-denominator diagnostic protocol paired with matched-coverage bootstrap and an apples-to-apples random-veto null. On AVeriTeC's Conflicting subset (N_C = 150), three-option judges return a directional verdict on more than 84% of mixed-evidence claims; under the typed schema, three-judge majority voting amplifies direction-on-conflict on AVeriTeC (0.887 vs. 0.840; 95% CI [+0.013, +0.080]) but does not replicate on VitaminC-Mixed. Walking an intervention ladder of common single-channel fixes (typed vocabulary, panel aggregation, confidence thresholding, validator-only filtering), each leaves a distinct residual failure: panel aggregation suppresses single-judge CONFLICTING dissent in 48% of CCO cases; the panel is well-calibrated for direction (ECE = 0.07 on pure-S/R) so confidence cannot operationally separate CCO from correct directional commits; validator-as-classifier nearly halves pure-evidence accuracy. A minimal two-channel reference probe reaches operating points neither single channel reaches; under the random-veto null its promotion to CONFLICTING is structurally targeted on AVeriTeC (empirical p < 1/2001) and weaker but in the same direction on VitaminC-Mixed, a selectivity result rather than a magnitude one. We argue for an external commitment-control layer that separates verdict generation from commitment authorization, using structural evidence and confidence as orthogonal channels and NO-COMMIT as a routed controller state.
Abstract:LLM judges increasingly turn verdicts into system commitments. Under mixed evidence (claims with both supporting and refuting sources) this is unsafe: when the schema exposes CONFLICTING as the authorized non-directional verdict, returning SUPPORTS/REFUTES is an unauthorized directional commitment, a failure we name Cherry-pick Override (CCO). We define CCO under an explicit task contract and report it with a same-denominator diagnostic protocol paired with matched-coverage bootstrap and an apples-to-apples random-veto null. On AVeriTeC's Conflicting subset (N_C = 150), three-option judges return a directional verdict on more than 84% of mixed-evidence claims; under the typed schema, three-judge majority voting amplifies direction-on-conflict on AVeriTeC (0.887 vs. 0.840; 95% CI [+0.013, +0.080]) but does not replicate on VitaminC-Mixed. Walking an intervention ladder of common single-channel fixes (typed vocabulary, panel aggregation, confidence thresholding, validator-only filtering), each leaves a distinct residual failure: panel aggregation suppresses single-judge CONFLICTING dissent in 48% of CCO cases; the panel is well-calibrated for direction (ECE = 0.07 on pure-S/R) so confidence cannot operationally separate CCO from correct directional commits; validator-as-classifier nearly halves pure-evidence accuracy. A minimal two-channel reference probe reaches operating points neither single channel reaches; under the random-veto null its promotion to CONFLICTING is structurally targeted on AVeriTeC (empirical p < 1/2001) and weaker but in the same direction on VitaminC-Mixed, a selectivity result rather than a magnitude one. We argue for an external commitment-control layer that separates verdict generation from commitment authorization, using structural evidence and confidence as orthogonal channels and NO-COMMIT as a routed controller state.
Software Engineering (cs.SE); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)
arXiv:2606.07834 [cs.SE]
(or arXiv:2606.07834v1 [cs.SE] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.07834 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 352 words
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