aiqbench analysis
This research addresses the critical tension between auditing machine unlearning efficacy and preserving user privacy, establishing a geometric lower bound on how behavioral queries inevitably leak information about retained training data. By analyzing model parameter-space geometry across convex and non-convex architectures, the study provides essential theoretical constraints for designing robust audit protocols in environments of mutual distrust. These findings are pivotal for advancing secure machine unlearning pipelines where verifying data removal without compromising privacy remains a central challenge.
Characterizing Privacy-Audit Alignment in Behavioral Audit of Machine Unlearning
arXiv:2606.14518v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The removal of learned data from Machine Learning models through Machine Unlearning (MU) has been widely studied; however, there is no agreed-upon scheme for auditing MU. Existing work shows that a dishonest model owner can falsify evidence to avoid executing MU, while curious auditors (and adversaries) can infer privacy-sensitive properties of the model and its training data even with limited access. Yet auditing of MU under mutual distrust between the model owner and the auditor remains unexplored. In this paper, we characterize how much a generic audit scheme that relies solely on querying the model for behavioral signals inevitably results in privacy leakage related to the retained set by providing a geometric transfer theorem that establishes a lower bound on retained set membership distinguishability based on the audit accuracy. In addition, we study how the unlearned set, target sample, and query protocol jointly determine the privacy-audit transfer coefficient through local and global model-parameter-space geometry. Our empirical experiments on both convex and non-convex models strongly support these results. Our results call for more careful consideration of the privacy-audit tension under a realistic auditor model and serve as a foundation for greater scrutiny of privacy-preserving audit scheme designs for the MU pipeline.
Abstract:The removal of learned data from Machine Learning models through Machine Unlearning (MU) has been widely studied; however, there is no agreed-upon scheme for auditing MU. Existing work shows that a dishonest model owner can falsify evidence to avoid executing MU, while curious auditors (and adversaries) can infer privacy-sensitive properties of the model and its training data even with limited access. Yet auditing of MU under mutual distrust between the model owner and the auditor remains unexplored. In this paper, we characterize how much a generic audit scheme that relies solely on querying the model for behavioral signals inevitably results in privacy leakage related to the retained set by providing a geometric transfer theorem that establishes a lower bound on retained set membership distinguishability based on the audit accuracy. In addition, we study how the unlearned set, target sample, and query protocol jointly determine the privacy-audit transfer coefficient through local and global model-parameter-space geometry. Our empirical experiments on both convex and non-convex models strongly support these results. Our results call for more careful consideration of the privacy-audit tension under a realistic auditor model and serve as a foundation for greater scrutiny of privacy-preserving audit scheme designs for the MU pipeline.
Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2606.14518 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2606.14518v2 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.14518 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 292 words
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