Skip to content
aiqbench takeAI Safety

aiqbench analysis

This research quantifies how multi-tenant contention degrades the reliability of KV-cache timing side channels in LLM serving systems, revealing that attack effectiveness collapses under realistic load rather than maintaining a consistent physical threshold. The study demonstrates that metrics derived from quiet environments significantly overestimate operational risks, with concurrency-depth variance emerging as the primary factor influencing effect size across different serving stacks like vLLM and SGLang. For security engineers deploying shared inference infrastructure, these findings are critical for accurately assessing privacy leakage risks in production environments where ambient noise is unavoidable.
Source coveringarXiv
What this isA model's reading of the article and related coverage, written for aiqbench. Not the publisher's words.

Characterizing Contention-Induced Reliability Collapse in KV-Cache Timing Side Channels for Multi-Tenant LLM Serving

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2609.06853v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Shared key--value (KV) cache reuse improves large language model (LLM) serving, but it can also create a timing side channel that reveals whether a prefix is already cached. Previous work shows that such attacks are possible, but their reliability under realistic multi-tenant contention is less understood. We study this problem through seven experiments on live shared LLM-serving systems. On a vLLM server running DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on NVIDIA GB10, mean Cohen's d drops from 0.7789 with no synthetic workers to 0.2109 with two workers (t=8.412), while higher worker counts cause no statistically detectable further loss. A 120-run sparse-overlap experiment places the best breakpoint at the boundary of the measured range (tau=0, 95% CI [0.000,0.113]), supporting an ambient-versus-loaded regime change rather than an internal physical threshold. AUROC falls from 0.650 at ambient to 0.531 near 61% overlap and partially recovers to 0.574 at saturation. Concurrency-depth variance is the strongest measured correlate of effect size (r=-0.416) and hit consistency (r=-0.637). An interleaved control preserves the same non-monotonic ordering. The main collapse is also reproduced on a real two-node, two-GPU tensor-parallel vLLM setup, where mean d falls from 3.418 to 0.511 (p<0.01). Two SGLang pilots are statistically inconclusive. Overall, KV-cache timing reliability depends strongly on the load regime and serving stack, and measurements on quiet systems can overestimate operational attack reliability.

Abstract:Shared key--value (KV) cache reuse improves large language model (LLM) serving, but it can also create a timing side channel that reveals whether a prefix is already cached. Previous work shows that such attacks are possible, but their reliability under realistic multi-tenant contention is less understood. We study this problem through seven experiments on live shared LLM-serving systems. On a vLLM server running DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on NVIDIA GB10, mean Cohen's d drops from 0.7789 with no synthetic workers to 0.2109 with two workers (t=8.412), while higher worker counts cause no statistically detectable further loss. A 120-run sparse-overlap experiment places the best breakpoint at the boundary of the measured range (tau=0, 95% CI [0.000,0.113]), supporting an ambient-versus-loaded regime change rather than an internal physical threshold. AUROC falls from 0.650 at ambient to 0.531 near 61% overlap and partially recovers to 0.574 at saturation. Concurrency-depth variance is the strongest measured correlate of effect size (r=-0.416) and hit consistency (r=-0.637). An interleaved control preserves the same non-monotonic ordering. The main collapse is also reproduced on a real two-node, two-GPU tensor-parallel vLLM setup, where mean d falls from 3.418 to 0.511 (p<0.01). Two SGLang pilots are statistically inconclusive. Overall, KV-cache timing reliability depends strongly on the load regime and serving stack, and measurements on quiet systems can overestimate operational attack reliability.

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2609.06853 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2609.06853v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.06853 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Full text under the publisher's open licence · 314 words

Related coverage