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This research formally analyzes CARTS, a method leveraging autoregressive language models to embed payloads within stegotext of identical length while preserving rank information across contexts. The study rigorously proves the construction's correctness under deterministic assumptions and empirically validates its resistance to key collisions and commuting attacks using Llama 3 8B. By establishing a theoretical foundation for message equivocation and context search, this work advances the constructive application of AI in cryptography and privacy-preserving communication.
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CARTS: Contextual Autoregressive Rank Transcoding Steganography for Full-Capacity Keyed Text Encoding

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2609.10744v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autoregressive language models can be used to transform a payload text into a stegotext of identical token length by preserving per-position rank information across contexts - a methodology we formalize as Contextual Autoregressive Rank Transcoding Steganography (CARTS). While the Calgacus construction of Norelli et al. demonstrated this phenomenon experimentally, no formal security analysis existed. This paper provides the first rigorous treatment of CARTS. We show its exact correctness under deterministic model assumptions, introduce a rank-coordinate representation in which keys act as bijections on rank-vector space, define relevant security notions and the computational problems naturally associated with the construction - context search, key collisions, message equivocation, and non-commutativity of the encoding maps - and study the theoretical relationships between them, including the characterization of message equivocation in terms of context search, and the tension between key collisions and message equivocation. An empirical study on Llama 3 8B confirms exact recovery of the original payload in all tested cases, finds no key collisions under random key generation, establishes that a hand-crafted collision is local rather than global, and finds no commuting key pairs - suggesting resistance to the attack vectors studied. This work opens a formally grounded research agenda for the constructive use of language models in cryptography and privacy-preserving communication.

Abstract:Autoregressive language models can be used to transform a payload text into a stegotext of identical token length by preserving per-position rank information across contexts - a methodology we formalize as Contextual Autoregressive Rank Transcoding Steganography (CARTS). While the Calgacus construction of Norelli et al. demonstrated this phenomenon experimentally, no formal security analysis existed. This paper provides the first rigorous treatment of CARTS. We show its exact correctness under deterministic model assumptions, introduce a rank-coordinate representation in which keys act as bijections on rank-vector space, define relevant security notions and the computational problems naturally associated with the construction - context search, key collisions, message equivocation, and non-commutativity of the encoding maps - and study the theoretical relationships between them, including the characterization of message equivocation in terms of context search, and the tension between key collisions and message equivocation. An empirical study on Llama 3 8B confirms exact recovery of the original payload in all tested cases, finds no key collisions under random key generation, establishes that a hand-crafted collision is local rather than global, and finds no commuting key pairs - suggesting resistance to the attack vectors studied. This work opens a formally grounded research agenda for the constructive use of language models in cryptography and privacy-preserving communication.

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2609.10744 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2609.10744v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.10744 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 310 words

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