aiqbench analysis
The study reveals that neither humans nor frontier multimodal large language models can reliably distinguish between authentic and AI-generated visual evidence in legal contexts, with human accuracy hovering near chance levels and MLLMs failing to detect most synthetic outputs. While MLLMs demonstrated perfect specificity by never misclassifying real images, their sensitivity to detect fakes remains critically low, indicating that current AI detectors are insufficient for standalone verification. Consequently, the authors conclude that visual evidence must be treated as inherently contestable, requiring a hybrid approach combining human review, AI screening, and robust provenance infrastructure like C2PA Content Credentials.
Can You Trust What You See? Human and AI Detection of Synthetic Legal Evidence
arXiv:2606.07613v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Visual evidence has long been treated as a reliable form of legal proof, but advances in artificial intelligence (AI) are undermining that assumption. This article asks how well humans and frontier multimodal large language models (MLLMs) can distinguish authentic evidentiary photographs from AI-generated counterparts in the object-centric scenarios typical of civil disputes. We built Synthetic Legal Evidence Detection (SLED-1400), a dataset of 200 authentic evidence images paired with 1,200 synthetic counterparts produced by six contemporary text-to-image generators across ten evidence categories. The same stimuli and response format were used in a controlled web experiment with 136 lay participants and in a standardized evaluation of four MLLMs (GPT-5.1, Gemini-3-Pro, Gemini-3-Flash, Qwen3-VL-235B). Human accuracy was 64.8% overall, and 48.5% and 51.0% on the two strongest generators (Gemini-3-Pro-Image and Flux-2-Max), indistinguishable from chance. MLLMs never misclassified an authentic image (100% specificity), but missed most synthetic outputs from the harder generators, with average MLLM detection at 5.9% on Gemini-3-Pro-Image outputs. Human and MLLM errors were largely uncorrelated, while the four MLLMs were strongly correlated with each other. Neither group is a reliable standalone authenticator. We argue that visual evidence in legal proceedings should be treated as inherently contestable, and that a workable procedural response must combine trained human review, MLLM screening, and provenance infrastructure such as C2PA Content Credentials.
Title:Can You Trust What You See? Human and AI Detection of Synthetic Legal Evidence
Abstract:Visual evidence has long been treated as a reliable form of legal proof, but advances in artificial intelligence (AI) are undermining that assumption. This article asks how well humans and frontier multimodal large language models (MLLMs) can distinguish authentic evidentiary photographs from AI-generated counterparts in the object-centric scenarios typical of civil disputes. We built Synthetic Legal Evidence Detection (SLED-1400), a dataset of 200 authentic evidence images paired with 1,200 synthetic counterparts produced by six contemporary text-to-image generators across ten evidence categories. The same stimuli and response format were used in a controlled web experiment with 136 lay participants and in a standardized evaluation of four MLLMs (GPT-5.1, Gemini-3-Pro, Gemini-3-Flash, Qwen3-VL-235B). Human accuracy was 64.8% overall, and 48.5% and 51.0% on the two strongest generators (Gemini-3-Pro-Image and Flux-2-Max), indistinguishable from chance. MLLMs never misclassified an authentic image (100% specificity), but missed most synthetic outputs from the harder generators, with average MLLM detection at 5.9% on Gemini-3-Pro-Image outputs. Human and MLLM errors were largely uncorrelated, while the four MLLMs were strongly correlated with each other. Neither group is a reliable standalone authenticator. We argue that visual evidence in legal proceedings should be treated as inherently contestable, and that a workable procedural response must combine trained human review, MLLM screening, and provenance infrastructure such as C2PA Content Credentials.
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2606.07613 [cs.CV]
(or arXiv:2606.07613v1 [cs.CV] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.07613 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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