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Can We Trust Item Response Theory for AI Evaluation?
arXiv:2607.15190v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI benchmarks increasingly leverage item-level statistical models, particularly item response theory (IRT), to estimate capabilities, rank systems, select informative examples, and diagnose benchmark quality. However, AI benchmark data often departs from the data regimes encountered in human testing, for which standard IRT estimation tools were originally developed: these benchmarks typically involve fewer evaluated models, far more items, and capability distributions that may be skewed, clustered, or multimodal. We examine how these regime mismatches challenge the reliability of IRT modeling for AI evaluation. Using item parameters and capability distributions derived from six widely used LLM benchmarks, we simulate response matrices under three common IRT models and compare four estimators used in recent benchmark studies: marginal maximum likelihood, Markov chain Monte Carlo, variational inference, and a neural pseudo-Siamese estimator. Across 18,000 simulation runs, we systematically evaluate computational feasibility, scalability, and the reliability of IRT inferences about model rankings, predicted performance, and item characteristics. Results show that classical estimators can become computationally infeasible for large benchmarks, whereas scalable estimators can produce unreliable item-level and ranking inferences with small or non-normally distributed model sets. This study identifies when latent trait models reliably support or risk distorting AI benchmarking claims, and what sample sizes and diagnostics are needed for trustworthy use.
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