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CACTUS introduces a novel attack vector for decentralized federated learning by embedding semantic backdoors that survive repeated model aggregation across diverse network topologies. The research demonstrates significant risks to system integrity when malicious nodes are present, highlighting the vulnerability of current consensus mechanisms in distributed AI environments. This work is critical for understanding the security boundaries of privacy-preserving machine learning architectures before deployment at scale.
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CACTUS: Mask-Guided Semantic Clean-Label Backdoors in Decentralized Federated Learning

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2609.02450v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Semantic triggers in federated learning (FL) can be less conspicuous than synthetic patches, but sample-dependent placement may weaken backdoor implantation across aggregation rounds. This challenge is compounded in decentralized FL (DFL), where topology-dependent peer aggregation repeatedly mixes local models. CACTUS converts label-consistent semantic pairs into target-directed representation shifts. Mask-guided, modality-specific operators isolate trigger effects, couple them across samples, and apply the shifts counterfactually to clean non-target embeddings before peer aggregation. Experiments cover speech, text, tabular, and image tasks under nine aggregation rules. With 30\% malicious nodes, CACTUS reaches a nine-rule mean attack success rate (ASR) of 51.2\% on Speech Commands and the highest nine-rule mean ASR among evaluated attacks on three of four modalities. Sensitivity analyses show that ASR varies with network topology and increases with the malicious-node ratio. These results indicate that CACTUS can propagate backdoors through repeated DFL aggregation.

Abstract:Semantic triggers in federated learning (FL) can be less conspicuous than synthetic patches, but sample-dependent placement may weaken backdoor implantation across aggregation rounds. This challenge is compounded in decentralized FL (DFL), where topology-dependent peer aggregation repeatedly mixes local models. CACTUS converts label-consistent semantic pairs into target-directed representation shifts. Mask-guided, modality-specific operators isolate trigger effects, couple them across samples, and apply the shifts counterfactually to clean non-target embeddings before peer aggregation. Experiments cover speech, text, tabular, and image tasks under nine aggregation rules. With 30\% malicious nodes, CACTUS reaches a nine-rule mean attack success rate (ASR) of 51.2\% on Speech Commands and the highest nine-rule mean ASR among evaluated attacks on three of four modalities. Sensitivity analyses show that ASR varies with network topology and increases with the malicious-node ratio. These results indicate that CACTUS can propagate backdoors through repeated DFL aggregation.

Machine Learning (cs.LG); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC)

arXiv:2609.02450 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2609.02450v1 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.02450 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 241 words

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