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This research identifies a critical security vulnerability in quantized Vision-Language-Action models, demonstrating that strategic bit-flips can completely disable robotic execution while random faults remain harmless. The study reveals that specific action-generating layers are disproportionately susceptible to these attacks and proposes defense mechanisms like weight protection and manifold-escape losses to restore system resilience. Understanding the relationship between model architecture (e.g., regression heads vs. flow-matching policies) and fault tolerance is essential for deploying safe embodied AI systems in real-world environments.
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Bit-Flip Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models: Action-Decoding Architecture Shapes the Vulnerability

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2608.15475v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Quantized Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models expose a weight-fault surface: Rowhammer-style faults can corrupt deployed INT8 bits. We present the first bit-flip attack on a VLA: a few gradient-selected flips reduce closed-loop success to $0\%$, while hundreds of random flips are harmless. Across four model variants spanning three action-head families, damaging bits concentrate in a few action-generating layers, but the empirical budget depends sharply on the head: direct regression and token policies fall in $1$--$5$ flips, whereas the evaluated flow-matching policies require ${\sim}100$--$300$. Our fixed-direction manifold-escape loss cuts \pizero{}'s budget from ${\sim}1000$ to ${\sim}100$ flips, and a matched five-direction sweep shows that the attack is not specific to an all-positive direction. On a direct head, protecting $3.1\%$ of weights preserves $60\%$ success at $K{=}100$, and protecting $5.3\%$ moves the open-loop break threshold from 3 to 100 flips. Finally, task-calibrated emulated $K{=}100$ flips yield $0/20$ real-robot successes, versus $14/20$ clean and $16/20$ global-random. Weight integrity is therefore a security boundary for embodied foundation models. Code is included as ancillary material.

Abstract:Quantized Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models expose a weight-fault surface: Rowhammer-style faults can corrupt deployed INT8 bits. We present the first bit-flip attack on a VLA: a few gradient-selected flips reduce closed-loop success to $0\%$, while hundreds of random flips are harmless. Across four model variants spanning three action-head families, damaging bits concentrate in a few action-generating layers, but the empirical budget depends sharply on the head: direct regression and token policies fall in $1$--$5$ flips, whereas the evaluated flow-matching policies require ${\sim}100$--$300$. Our fixed-direction manifold-escape loss cuts \pizero{}'s budget from ${\sim}1000$ to ${\sim}100$ flips, and a matched five-direction sweep shows that the attack is not specific to an all-positive direction. On a direct head, protecting $3.1\%$ of weights preserves $60\%$ success at $K{=}100$, and protecting $5.3\%$ moves the open-loop break threshold from 3 to 100 flips. Finally, task-calibrated emulated $K{=}100$ flips yield $0/20$ real-robot successes, versus $14/20$ clean and $16/20$ global-random. Weight integrity is therefore a security boundary for embodied foundation models. Code is included as ancillary material.

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2608.15475 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2608.15475v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.15475 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

code/analysis/analyze_cancellation_multiseed.py

code/bfa_vla/__init__.py

code/bfa_vla/int8_attack.py

code/openvla/discrete_defense.py

code/openvla/discrete_full_int8.py

code/openvla/discrete_spatial_attack.py

code/openvla/discrete_suite_attack.py

code/openvla/libero_eval_adapter.py

code/openvla/simplerenv_attack.py

code/pi0/direction_sweep.py

code/pi0/eval_adapter.py

code/pi0/step_cancellation.py

code/pi05/attack_pi05.py

code/pi05/load_pi05.py

code/pyproject.toml

code/real_robot/apply_logical_flips.py

code/requirements.txt

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 296 words

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