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This research shifts the focus of prompt injection defenses from isolated chatbots to complex multi-agent ecosystems, revealing how inter-agent communication and shared tool access create unique attack vectors invisible to standard perimeter guards. The study demonstrates that architectural changes—such as message signing with provenance tracking and privilege-scoped tool access—can drastically reduce vulnerability rates compared to relying solely on system-prompt guardrails. For practitioners building autonomous agent swarms, these findings highlight the critical need for internal boundary enforcement rather than just input filtering.
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Beyond Single-Model Injection: A Threat Model and Defense Architecture for Prompt Injection in Multi-Agent Systems

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2609.22949v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Existing prompt injection research focuses on single-model chatbot scenarios, where an attacker manipulates one LLM through crafted input. Multi-agent systems amplify this threat through three mechanisms absent from single-model settings: inter-agent message passing creates injection channels invisible to perimeter defenses, shared tool access enables privilege escalation across agent boundaries, and trust propagation allows a compromised agent to influence upstream orchestrators. We construct a threat model enumerating 14 attack vectors across four categories: direct injection via user input (3 vectors), indirect injection via tool outputs (4 vectors), inter-agent injection via message passing (4 vectors), and cascading injection through orchestrator manipulation (3 vectors). Testing all 14 vectors against a 6-agent production-representative system, we find that 67% of agents are vulnerable to at least one scope violation even with system-prompt-level guardrails, and indirect injection via tool outputs succeeds in 43% of attempts. Four architectural defenses reduce overall injection success from 31.2% to 4.2%: message signing with provenance tracking (inter-agent injection down 91%), input/output sanitization at agent boundaries (indirect injection down 78%), privilege-scoped tool access per agent role (privilege escalation eliminated entirely), and anomaly detection on inter-agent communication patterns (84% of cascading attempts caught).

Abstract:Existing prompt injection research focuses on single-model chatbot scenarios, where an attacker manipulates one LLM through crafted input. Multi-agent systems amplify this threat through three mechanisms absent from single-model settings: inter-agent message passing creates injection channels invisible to perimeter defenses, shared tool access enables privilege escalation across agent boundaries, and trust propagation allows a compromised agent to influence upstream orchestrators. We construct a threat model enumerating 14 attack vectors across four categories: direct injection via user input (3 vectors), indirect injection via tool outputs (4 vectors), inter-agent injection via message passing (4 vectors), and cascading injection through orchestrator manipulation (3 vectors). Testing all 14 vectors against a 6-agent production-representative system, we find that 67% of agents are vulnerable to at least one scope violation even with system-prompt-level guardrails, and indirect injection via tool outputs succeeds in 43% of attempts. Four architectural defenses reduce overall injection success from 31.2% to 4.2%: message signing with provenance tracking (inter-agent injection down 91%), input/output sanitization at agent boundaries (indirect injection down 78%), privilege-scoped tool access per agent role (privilege escalation eliminated entirely), and anomaly detection on inter-agent communication patterns (84% of cascading attempts caught).

Accepted at the AIWILD Workshop, ICML 2026. Camera-ready version

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)

arXiv:2609.22949 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2609.22949v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.22949 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 304 words

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