aiqbench analysis
This research extends the Maximum Occupancy Principle to partially observable environments, offering a belief-based reformulation of Expected Free Energy for Active Inference that enables tractable offline computation. By incorporating hidden state inference into the agent's state, the study demonstrates how agents can effectively balance goal-directed behaviors with exploration in uncertain settings without relying on explicit prior preferences.
Belief-Based Maximum Occupancy Principle and Active Inference
arXiv:2609.39342v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Intrinsic motivation plays a central role in adaptive and goal-directed behavior by conferring agents reward-independent objectives and biases useful to act in noisy and uncertain environments. Active Inference addresses the problem of acting in a partially observable environment through a principled framework for belief updating and action selection. A key component of Active Inference is the specification of prior preferences, which shapes behavior by encoding desirable future outcomes. An intrinsic motivation approach called the Maximum Occupancy Principle (MOP) proposes that agents act so as to maximize occupancy over future paths of states and actions, with no preferences or epistemic targets. Despite its simple formulation, MOP gives rise to rich and adaptive behaviors that combine exploratory variability with goal-directed dynamics. In this work, we extend MOP to partially observable environments and introduce a Bellman reformulation of the Expected Free Energy for Active Inference, both incorporating belief-based inference over hidden states as part of the agent state. The Bellman formulation enables tractable offline computation via value iteration over the full belief-state space. We compare the resulting behaviors in a set of minimal experimental settings with uncertain food sources. We find that MOP agents switch between goal-directed (food seeking) behavior and exploration between different food sources, depending on their energy available and their belief state. In contrast, Active Inference agents mostly inhabit regions around a single food source, a strategy having both high pragmatic and epistemic value. We finally compare with Empowerment, which is shown to be qualitatively similar to Active Inference.
Abstract:Intrinsic motivation plays a central role in adaptive and goal-directed behavior by conferring agents reward-independent objectives and biases useful to act in noisy and uncertain environments. Active Inference addresses the problem of acting in a partially observable environment through a principled framework for belief updating and action selection. A key component of Active Inference is the specification of prior preferences, which shapes behavior by encoding desirable future outcomes. An intrinsic motivation approach called the Maximum Occupancy Principle (MOP) proposes that agents act so as to maximize occupancy over future paths of states and actions, with no preferences or epistemic targets. Despite its simple formulation, MOP gives rise to rich and adaptive behaviors that combine exploratory variability with goal-directed dynamics. In this work, we extend MOP to partially observable environments and introduce a Bellman reformulation of the Expected Free Energy for Active Inference, both incorporating belief-based inference over hidden states as part of the agent state. The Bellman formulation enables tractable offline computation via value iteration over the full belief-state space. We compare the resulting behaviors in a set of minimal experimental settings with uncertain food sources. We find that MOP agents switch between goal-directed (food seeking) behavior and exploration between different food sources, depending on their energy available and their belief state. In contrast, Active Inference agents mostly inhabit regions around a single food source, a strategy having both high pragmatic and epistemic value. We finally compare with Empowerment, which is shown to be qualitatively similar to Active Inference.
Accepted at the 7th International Workshop on Active Inference (IWAI 2026, Madrid). To appear in Springer CCIS proceedings
Neurons and Cognition (q-bio.NC); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2609.39342 [q-bio.NC]
(or arXiv:2609.39342v1 [q-bio.NC] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.39342 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 365 words
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