aiqbench analysis
This research proposes a neuro-symbolic pipeline that combines LLMs with symbolic frameworks like MulVAL to generate auditable attack graphs for agentic penetration testing. By translating scanner outputs into formal predicates, the system achieves practical runtime speeds while addressing the lack of explicit reasoning in pure LLM-based agents. Although current rule coverage and path precision remain limiting factors, this approach offers a feasible direction for integrating rigorous security logic into autonomous workflows.
Automating Attack Graph Construction for Agentic Pentesting. Towards Neuro-Symbolic Vulnerability Hunting
arXiv:2609.15523v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Logic attack graphs grounded in scanner output provide explicit and auditable attack path reasoning LLM-based agents lack. Integrating symbolic frameworks such as MulVAL to contemporary security workflows or agentic pipelines, however, requires translating scanner evidence to initial facts, and creating domain-specific rules. We present a semi-automated pipeline that addresses this interoperability problem and depict its feasibility in a web-security case study. Our pipeline parses findings from Trivy, Semgrep, and Nmap into MulVAL predicates and uses an LLM-assisted process to construct domain-specific Datalog rules linking scanner-detectable evidence to attack techniques. MulVAL/XSB then performs symbolic inference to generate structured attack paths. We evaluate the attack-graph construction infrastructure on 54 web Capture-the-Flag tasks from CyBench within an agentic pipeline (Hybrid Reasoner); we do not evaluate the performance of the downstream agent. Every task produced at least one goal-reaching graph, and we achieve mean ground-truth vulnerability coverage of 53.7%, with 51.9% achieving full coverage; mean noise-path rate was 83.9%. With median end-to-end time of 24.9 s (MulVAL reasoning: 2.7 s) the pipeline is feasible and runtime-practical for agentic workflows, but predicate coverage, rule coverage, and path precision remain limiting factors. Next steps include semantic rule validation and agent-level comparison for graph-guided pentesting.
Abstract:Logic attack graphs grounded in scanner output provide explicit and auditable attack path reasoning LLM-based agents lack. Integrating symbolic frameworks such as MulVAL to contemporary security workflows or agentic pipelines, however, requires translating scanner evidence to initial facts, and creating domain-specific rules. We present a semi-automated pipeline that addresses this interoperability problem and depict its feasibility in a web-security case study. Our pipeline parses findings from Trivy, Semgrep, and Nmap into MulVAL predicates and uses an LLM-assisted process to construct domain-specific Datalog rules linking scanner-detectable evidence to attack techniques. MulVAL/XSB then performs symbolic inference to generate structured attack paths. We evaluate the attack-graph construction infrastructure on 54 web Capture-the-Flag tasks from CyBench within an agentic pipeline (Hybrid Reasoner); we do not evaluate the performance of the downstream agent. Every task produced at least one goal-reaching graph, and we achieve mean ground-truth vulnerability coverage of 53.7%, with 51.9% achieving full coverage; mean noise-path rate was 83.9%. With median end-to-end time of 24.9 s (MulVAL reasoning: 2.7 s) the pipeline is feasible and runtime-practical for agentic workflows, but predicate coverage, rule coverage, and path precision remain limiting factors. Next steps include semantic rule validation and agent-level comparison for graph-guided pentesting.
Cite as: Stevanovic, O., & Wachter, J. (2026). Automating attack graph construction for agentic pentesting: Towards neuro-symbolic vulnerability hunting. In D. Hitaj et al. (Eds.), ESORICS 2026 workshops. Springer Nature Switzerland AG
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2609.15523 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2609.15523v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.15523 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
Full text under the publisher's open licence · 252 words
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