aiqbench analysis
AURA-Eval introduces a granular diagnostic framework for assessing LLM agent safety by analyzing tool-use trajectories rather than relying on single-score metrics. The study reveals a critical divergence where frontier models better recognize risks and propose safe alternatives when options exist, whereas open-weight models frequently execute unsafe requests under similar conditions. This research is essential for understanding the reliability boundaries of autonomous agents in high-stakes workflows.
AURA-Eval: Evaluation Framework for Acting Under Risk Awareness in LLM Agent Trajectories
arXiv:2609.06783v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents operate in workflows where unsafe actions can have real consequences. Existing safety evaluations often reduce behavior to a single score, obscuring risk recognition, pre-action detection, and safe task completion when a safe solution exists. We introduce AURA-Eval, a framework combining controlled augmentation with granular diagnosis of behavior in tool-use trajectories. Its pipeline identifies safety-critical decision points, generates controlled variations, and constructs counterparts differing in whether a request has a safe fulfillment path. Using 157 sourced trajectories, we generate 1,249 evaluation items and evaluate 20 frontier and open-weight models. We developed rubrics to classify risk detection, action strategy, and scenario-specific action safety. Our results show that LLM agents engage in unsafe behavior more often when no safe fulfillment path exists. In these cases, frontier proprietary models more often recognize risk and exhibit safer behavior by proposing alternatives, while evaluated open-weight models more often directly execute unsafe requests. Increasing impact or reducing opportunities for oversight before execution also exposes greater vulnerability across models.
Abstract:LLM agents operate in workflows where unsafe actions can have real consequences. Existing safety evaluations often reduce behavior to a single score, obscuring risk recognition, pre-action detection, and safe task completion when a safe solution exists. We introduce AURA-Eval, a framework combining controlled augmentation with granular diagnosis of behavior in tool-use trajectories. Its pipeline identifies safety-critical decision points, generates controlled variations, and constructs counterparts differing in whether a request has a safe fulfillment path. Using 157 sourced trajectories, we generate 1,249 evaluation items and evaluate 20 frontier and open-weight models. We developed rubrics to classify risk detection, action strategy, and scenario-specific action safety. Our results show that LLM agents engage in unsafe behavior more often when no safe fulfillment path exists. In these cases, frontier proprietary models more often recognize risk and exhibit safer behavior by proposing alternatives, while evaluated open-weight models more often directly execute unsafe requests. Increasing impact or reducing opportunities for oversight before execution also exposes greater vulnerability across models.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Software Engineering (cs.SE)
arXiv:2609.06783 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2609.06783v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.06783 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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